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SECURED CREDITORS AND EXPENSES OF
BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION
DAVID GRAY CARLSON*
In any complex bankruptcy proceeding one of the most
poignant questions facing the parties and the court is who must
pay the trustee's expenses. In addition to routine administrative
costs, such expenses may include costs of disposing of estate as-
sets, or, in reorganization proceedings, expenses necessary to pre-
serve the assets and going-concern value of the debtor's business.
In this Article, Professor David Gray Carlson undertakes a com-
prehensive examination of the law of bankruptcy expense alloca-
tion through the lens of Bankruptcy Code section 506(c), the
trustee's principle tool for charging expenses to secured creditors.
After a careful examination of priority and collateral valuation
issues under section 506(c), Professor Carlson suggests a rule for
Chapter 11 reorganizations by which expenses properly allocable
to secured creditors can be distinguished from ordinary expenses
of reorganization traditionally borne by unsecured parties. Spe-
cifically, he suggests that secured creditors whose liens encumber
a debtor's entire cash flow should bear any costs in excess of
debtor equity associated with preserving that income. Among se-
cured parties whose liens do not reach cash flow, Professor Carl-
son suggests charging only that portion of maintenance expense
that does not exceed a proper valuation of the secured party's
collateral The Article concludes by testing the proposed rule
against holdings in several bankruptcy cases.
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Against the secured creditor's right to adequate protection in bank-
ruptcy1 stands its lesser known mirror opposite-the trustee's right
under Bankruptcy Code section 506(c) 2 to charge the secured creditor
for expenses of preserving or disposing of the collateral. The two are
mirror opposites in this sense: Adequate protection prohibits, while sec-
tion 506(c) invites, the reduction of the secured creditor's entitlements in
bankruptcy.
Left unguarded, section 506(c) threatens to swallow adequate pro-
tection whole. It is a breach in the front lines of adequate protection
through which ordinary administrative expenses may pour.
On the other hand, section 506(c) is an admirable weapon against an
insidious tendency in state law to permit the creation of great floating
liens that soak up all conceivable assets of the debtor, leaving nothing in
the bankrupt estate for general creditors or even for administrative costs.
The floating lien has unquestionably accelerated the phenomenon of the
assetless bankruptcy. These liens go so far as to encumber the income
streams of businesses, so that even incoming cash belongs to the secured
creditors. Section 506(c) combats the pervasive floating lien by permit-
ting the trustee to charge the secured creditor for services rendered-
charges that state law would not permit.3 Section 506(c) may be de-
fended, then, as a partial undoing of the unduly powerful rights given to
secured parties by state law-a remedy that is necessary if bankruptcy
1. Section 363(e) of the United States Bankruptcy Code provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request of an
entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used,
sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or
condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of
such interest.
11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988) (emphasis added). Adequate protection was introduced or at least
substantially transformed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. For a history of pre-Code
adequate protection, see David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 577, 581-90 (1989).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1988). Section 506(c) provides: "The trustee may recover from
property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of
preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such
claim." Id.
3. For example, under § 506(c) a secured creditor can be made to contribute to the oper-
ation of a business. In re AFCO Enters., Inc., 35 B.R. 512, 514-15 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983)
(Clark, J.) (secured creditor made to finance upkeep of resort hotel). Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, on the other hand, provides that a secured creditor simply may take the
collateral without contributing anything to its upkeep, even though this cost is exported to the
general creditors of the debtor. See U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (1972).
Sometimes real estate law requires that, where a mortgagee claims rental income, the first
charge upon that income is upkeep of the property. See, eg., In re Brandon Assocs., 128 B.R.
729, 733-34 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991) (Krumm, J.) (describing Virginia law); In re Coniam, 9
B.R. 306, 309 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (Krechevsky, J.) (describing Connecticut law).
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trustees are to be paid.'
A mediating principle is therefore necessary to make clear when the
bankruptcy trustee may legitimately charge the secured creditor with ex-
penses and when such charges must be rejected as illicit attempts to shift
the expenses of unsecured creditors onto secured creditors. Currently,
courts resort to slogans that admonish trustees to charge the secured
creditor only when the secured creditor is "directly" or "primarily" ben-
efited by the expense.' Such slogans simply repeat the question; instead,
what is "primary" or "direct" must be made explicit by a theory of sec-
tion 506(c)'s scope and purpose.
This Article suggests a theory whereby the ordinary expenses of a
reorganization may be distinguished from expenses properly borne by
the secured creditor. According to this theory, if the security interest is a
"floating lien" that encumbers the entire bankrupt estate, including the
cash flow of a going concern, courts should freely charge the secured
creditor with the expenses relevant to maintaining the cash flow. But if
the security interest does not reach the cash flow, then courts should not
charge the secured creditors with all the expenses of maintaining the in-
come. Instead, the court should charge some lesser amount depending
on how it values the collateral involved: if the court values the collateral
according to a liquidation standard, nothing should be charged. If, on
the other hand, the court uses a "going-concern" value for the collateral,
it should charge a portion of the maintenance expense. The amount
under the going-concern standard can be determined by imagining what
would have happened if the automatic stay had been lifted and the se-
cured creditor had repossessed. Any of the administrative expenses that
would have been incurred by the secured creditor between the lifting of
the stay and the selling of the property should be charged to the secured
creditor.
Two preliminary questions must be answered before this theory can
be fully explored. The first goes to the exact priority of the trustee's
claim against the collateral under section 506(c). Surprisingly, this topic
has received almost no attention in the literature, perhaps on the mis-
taken assumption that the priority is well understood. An examination
of the cases shows that the courts are deeply divided on the priority ques-
tion. For example, trustees have succeeded in setting off section 506(c)
4. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5826 (declaring policy to encourage members of the bar to render the necessary and
exacting services that bankruptcy requires); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 330
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6286 (declaring policy of encouraging bank-
ruptcy specialists to remain in the field).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 202-16.
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expenses against the secured creditor's entitlement to postpetition inter-
est and collection expenses under section 506(b).6 This setoff imposes
expenses on secured creditors that should properly be borne by the
trustee. Alternatively, courts have approved schemes whereby the se-
cured creditor shares section 506(c) expenses pro rata with junior se-
cured creditors or with the trustee.7 This likewise imposes on secured
creditors expenses they should not bear. These abuses would disappear if
the exact priority of section 506(c) expenses were understood. Part I of
this Article examines the question of priority, including such issues as the
standing of creditors other than the trustee to sue the secured creditor
under section 506(c); the in personam nature of this right to sue; and the
effect of a section 506(c) charge on the unsecured deficit claim of a se-
cured creditor.8
Part I also considers whether secured creditors could be charged
with the ordinary expenses of bankruptcy administration without the aid
of section 506(c). One device is section 552(b),9 which, according to the
legislative history, allows a trustee to disencumber a secured creditor's
right to cash proceeds if the equities demand. The legislative history ex-
pressly mentions "expenditures by the estate relating to the proceeds." 10
It is unclear, however whether this idea adds anything not already im-
plicit in section 506(c). Another such theory states that lawyers and
other professionals may be paid on an interim basis under section 331 of
the Bankruptcy Code. If such payments are made and adequate protec-
tion of security interests later fails, the secured creditors bear the cost of
the trustee's professional advice because payment to the professionals
under section 331 is final and need not be returned. The weight of au-
thority is certainly against this theory,1' although courts must be careful
in disposing of the lawyers not to endanger ordinary course transactions,
which also rely on interim payments that are junior to secured creditor
rights. Finally, Part I discusses attempts to shift expenses to secured
creditors in cases involving the pledge of unencumbered assets to a
postpetition lender who agrees to pay the trustee and her lawyers di-
rectly. These "carve-out" orders are designed to make sure that the loan
proceeds never enter the bankrupt estate. Thus, if a secured creditor's
adequate protection fails, unencumbered assets that ought to compensate
6. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988); see infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
8. As will be seen, a § 506(c) charge necessarily implies that a creditor is undersecured.
See infra text accompanying notes 12-39.
9. 11 U.S.C § 552(b) (1988).
10. 124 CONG. REc. 32,400 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
11. See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
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the secured creditors have been funneled to the trustee's lawyers instead.
Like the argument that professional payments under section 331 are fi-
nal, this theory is designed to ensure that, when adequate protection of a
security interest fails, the lawyers may nevertheless keep their fees, even
though they are junior to the rights of secured creditors. If this occurs,
the secured creditors have borne the expenses of bankruptcy administra-
tion when section 506(c) demands that the secured creditors be held
harmless.
A second matter to be addressed is the relationship between the
scope of section 506(c) and the valuation theory a court uses with regard
to collateral. Under many theories of value, collateral is assessed by im-
agining the amount a buyer would pay for collateral, reduced by the ex-
pected costs of the transaction, so that the measure of the collateral
becomes what the secured creditor would realize from the sale. Yet sec-
tion 506(c) allows the trustee to extract the same transaction costs from
the secured creditor that are deducted in such a valuation theory. Conse-
quently, the secured creditor effectively pays twice for the same transac-
tion. Part II of this Article describes the relationship between (1)
expected transaction costs on the amount of a secured claim in bank-
ruptcy, and (2) the actual transaction costs the trustee wants to recover
under section 506(c). Part II shows that, if an allowed secured claim is
reduced by the amount of expected transaction costs, certain substantive
rules on the allocation of actual expenses to the secured creditor must
follow. That is, a bankruptcy court's theory of value will of necessity
influence the trustee's substantive right to charge expenses under section
506(c).
Part III argues for a theory that separates the ordinary expenses of
administration from expenses properly allocated to a secured creditor.
Such a theory is especially important in reorganization cases, where the
collateral might never be sold. The theory demands answers to two key
factual questions. First, is the secured creditor oversecured? If so, the
equity cushion may be freely invaded to finance any legitimate expense of
the trustee, so long as the secured claim is otherwise adequately pro-
tected. Second, who owns the cash flow? If a floating lien comprehends
all income, the secured creditor should pay ordinary administrative ex-
penses. If the cash flow is unencumbered, the bankrupt estate should
pay, except that the trustee may retain any administrative expenses that
the secured creditor would have incurred had there been no bankruptcy.
These rules will better determine whether the secured creditor or the
bankrupt estate should bear the costs of administration in a
reorganization.
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I. THE TRUSTEE'S RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 506(c)
A. Priority
It is a universal rule of debtor-creditor law that the highest priority
to proceeds from a foreclosure sale goes to reimburse the enforcement
officer who conducted the sale. 12 Without this priority, no independent
enforcement officer would proceed. The Bankruptcy Code follows this
rule in section 506(c), which permits a bankruptcy trustee to collect sales
and preservation expenses from the collateral.13 Although section 506(c)
does not say this directly, it clearly implies as much: "The trustee may
recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable,
necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property
to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim."' 4 This provision
necessarily means that the trustee or her subrogees may invade an al-
lowed secured claiml 5 -provided, of course, that the expenses are rea-
sonable, necessary, and to the benefit of the secured creditor. The statute
must confer on the trustee the power to invade the secured claim because
the trustee already has the right to invade debtor equity, which is, after
all, property of the estate. 16
12. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(a) (1972).
13. The legislative history claims this codifies pre-Code law. See H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 357 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6313; S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5854. For history of pre-Code
law, see Leigh H. Savage, The Secured Claimholder's Liability for the Costs and Expenses
Incurred in Bankruptcy, 90 COM. L.J. 430, 434-40 (1985); J. Hobson Presley, Jr., Note, The
Cost of Realization by the Secured Creditor in Bankruptcy, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1091, 1092-93
(1975) [hereinafter Presley, Note].
Judge Johnson recently expressed the view that § 506(c) is a codification of the "common
fund" doctrine. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Delta
Towers, Ltd.), 924 F.2d 74, 78-79 (5th Cir. 1991). According to this doctrine, admiralty lien
creditors must pay the expenses necessary to preserve property in custodia legis. See New
York Dock Co. v. The S.S. Poznan, 274 U.S. 117, 121 (1927) (Stone, J.). As to whether
§ 506(c) has preempted the "common fund" doctrine, Judge Johnson thought that only "ex-
ceptional circumstances" justified using it in cases where § 506(c) barred recovery. First Feed,
924 F.2d at 79. As an example of "exceptional circumstances," Johnson cited Fanelli v. Hens-
ley (In re Triangle Chemicals, Inc.), 697 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1983), in which Judge Tate ruled
that the equitable doctrine justified compensating an attorney whose employment was not ap-
proved in advance by the bankruptcy court, as Bankruptcy Code § 327(a) requires. Id. at
1289. Fanelli was not, however, a case in which secured creditors were made to pay. See id. at
1282. Rather, the general creditors paid the attorney's fee on the theory that the bankrupt
estate was enhanced in value. Id.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1988).
15. See In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 298-99 (7th Cir. 1982) (Swygert, J.) (reversing
district court ruling that § 506(c) expenses may only be taken out of debtor equity); In re
AFCO Enters., Inc., 35 B.R. 512, 514 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983) (Clark, J.) (allowing invasion of
secured claim).
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(3) (1988) (after notice and hearing, trustee may obtain credit
by placing a junior lien on collateral).
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For example, assume a creditor owns an allowed secured claim of
$90 on collateral that the trustee sells for $100. Assume also that the
trustee has incurred $8 of reasonable and necessary sales expense. Of the
$100, $10 is debtor equity and already property of the bankrupt estate.
Here, the trustee does not need section 506(c) to recover the $8 sales
expense. It can be taken out of the debtor equity.17 If section 506(c) is
unneeded on these facts, then it must exist for the sole purpose of al-
lowing the trustee to invade the secured claim. Thus, if the trustee's ex-
penses were $12, it is necessary for the trustee to invade the secured
claim for $2. This is precisely what section 506(c) permits.
Trustees take special delight in imposing section 506(c) expenses on
the secured creditor without touching the debtor equity. For example,
the trustee with the $8 expense and $10 in debtor equity will sometimes
try to reduce the secured creditor's claim from $90 to $82 (or try to get
straight reimbursement from the secured creditor, which is the same
thing). If the trustee succeeds, the estate is enriched-the maneuver pre-
serves an asset of the bankrupt estate and foists some costs on the secured
creditor. To be sure, if the secured creditor's secured claim is reduced by
these charges, the secured creditor is compensated with a larger counter-
vailing unsecured claim. 8 But the secured claim is paid out 100 cents on
the dollar; the unsecured claim is usually paid out for far less. Therefore,
the estate benefits if the trustee can take administrative expenses out of
the secured claim, rather than out of the debtor equity which already
belongs to the estate.
On its face, section 506(c) sanctions the recovery of expenses "from
property securing an allowed secured claim." 19 This language allows for
access to debtor equity, but it does not permit the invasion of a secured
claim unless the trustee's 506(c) claim and the secured creditor's claim
against the property are, in combination, greater than the value of the
collateral. Only when the two claims overwhelm the value of the collat-
eral-when the debtor equity is exhausted--does section 506(c) sanction
the invasion of the secured claim.
Courts usually protect the secured creditor from invasions of the
secured claim before the debtor equity is exhausted, although they fre-
17. The $8 expense would be an administrative expense under Bankruptcy Code § 503(b).
See Id. § 503(b). The trustee would have an administrative priority for this expense under
§ 507(a), id. § 507(a), which will be vindicated in distributions under Chapter 7 in § 726(a), id.
§ 726(a), or in Chapter 11 reorganizations under § 1129(a)(9)(A), id. § 1 129(a)(9)(A). See also
id §§ 1226(b)(1), 1326(b)(1) (requiring administrative claimants to be paid in cash before
other creditors in family farm or wage plans).
18. Id. § 506(a). The basis for this claim is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes
66-79.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c).
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quently do so in confusing terminology. It is common in such cases for
the court to say that the expenses produced-no "benefit" for the secured
creditor, as section 506(c) requires."0 It would be clearer if the courts
simply said that the expenses must first come out of debtor equity.
A second way trustees try to accomplish their illegitimate goal of
raiding the secured claim before the equity is exhausted is by trying to set
off section 506(c) expenses against section 506(b) entitlements to postpe-
tition interest and collection expenses21 at a time when unencumbered
equity still exists.22 Setoff cases can be unfair when the debtor equity is
valuable enough that the secured creditor would never bear the 506(c)
expenses.23
Suppose, again, that the secured creditor's claim is $90 and the col-
lateral is worth $100. Suppose further that, under section 506(b), the
20. See, eg., Schindler v. Sharak (In re Salzman), 83 B.R. 233, 240-41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1988) (Schwartzberg, J.); In re West Post Rd. Properties Corp., 44 B.R. 244, 247 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Schwartzberg, J.); Federal Land Bank v. Belew (In re Belew), 44 B.R. 12, 13-
14 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984) (Brelend, J.); see also In re Creed Bros., 70 B.R. 583, 587 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Schwartzberg, J.) (interpreting the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
21. An equity cushion implies that a secured creditor is oversecured and hence entitled to
receive postpetition interest and collection expenses under Bankruptcy Code § 506(b). Section
506(b) provides:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of
which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the
amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on
such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agree-
ment under which such claim arose.
11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988). Of course, if there is no debtor equity, the secured claim consists of
any prepetition amounts claimed plus any § 506(b) interest and collection expenses already
accrued. David Gray Carlson, Oversecured Creditors Under Bankruptcy Code Section 506(b):
The Limits of Postpetition Interest, Attorneys' Fees, and Collection Expenses, 7 BANKR. DEv. J.
381, 389-91 (1990) (describing how accruing postpetition interest increases the size of the se-
cured claim). In such a case, § 506(c) justifies invading the secured claim and, with it, any
accrued 506(b) entitlements. In re Chateau Royale, Ltd., 6 B.R. 8, 13 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980)
(Sauls, J.).
22. Crownover v. Manufacturers Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Central Foundry
Co.), 45 B.R. 395, 407-08 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984) (Wright, J.). A setoff was not demanded in
Central Foundry, but it is clear it was awarded. See id. Nevertheless, the secured creditor was
oversecured and entitled to postpetition interest. Id. The invasion of the secured claim under
these conditions amounts to the same as a setoff. See In re Elmwood Farm, Inc., 19 B.R. 338,
340-41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Schwartzberg, J.) (trustee allowed to invade secured claims
while secured parties oversecured and entitled to postpetition interest); Chateau Royale, 6 B.R.
at 13 (setoff allowed, but not clear that creditor oversecured at time of setoff).
23. There is a theory that would allow the setoff and the priority that § 506(c) demands.
According to this theory, entitlements under § 506(b) do not lock in until the estate is distrib-
uted or the Chapter 11 plan is confirmed. See McCombs Properties VI, Ltd. v. First Tex. Say.
Ass'n (In re McCombs Properties VI, Ltd.), 88 B.R. 261, 266 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) (Ryan,
J.); In re National Computer Communications Corp., 85 B.R. 6, 7 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1988)
(Schiff, J.); Niall L. O'Toole, Adequate Protection and Postpetition Interest in Chapter 11 Pro-
ceedings, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 251, 262-74 (1982). Curiously, this view of § 506(b) entitle-
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
secured creditor is entitled to claim another $5 for postpetition interest
and collection expenses and that the trustee's enforcement expenses are
$4. If the collateral is liquidated, the secured creditor ought to get $95,
the trustee should get $4 in section 506(c) expenses, and the estate should
receive $1. If the trustee is allowed to set off the $4 in section 506(c)
expenses against the secured creditor's 506(b) expenses, then the secured
creditor gets only $91, while the trustee gets $4 in expenses, and the es-
tate takes $5. This seems unfair; section 506(c) authorizes payment of
the $4 in expenses from the collateral, but it does not permit the invasion
of the secured claim until the debtor equity is exhausted.24 Under the
setoff rule, oversecured creditors are made to bear these expenses, to the
benefit of general unsecured creditors.
Equally unacceptable are holdings that require secured parties to
share a pro rata burden of expenses, even though the equity cushion has
not been depleted, or even though one secured creditor has priority over
the other.25 A senior secured creditor should bear no part of 506(c) ex-
penses until debtor equity is exhausted. To put it another way, a senior
secured creditor is entitled to a sort of "absolute priority rule" whereby
her claim may not be invaded if the bankrupt estate or a junior secured
creditor receives any recovery at all. On the other hand, where two se-
cured parties claim two separate pieces of collateral, and the transfer in-
curs a joint expense for the sale of both, proration is appropriate. In this
ments most closely resembles the state of the law under the old Bankruptcy Act. See Carlson,
supra note 1, at 590-96.
Under this view of § 506(b), the trustee is always free to invade the secured claim (to the
extent of postpetition interest or collection expenses, but not further) simply because the se-
cured creditor is not entitled to adequate protection of this part of the secured claim.
24. The state-law result is similar. See U.C.C. § 9-504(l)(a) (1972) (implying that such
expenses are a charge against collateral independent of the secured creditor's senior claim, so
that debtor equity picks up these costs when such equity exists).
25. Central Foundry, 45 B.R. at 407; Elmwood Farm, 19 B.R. at 342. According to one
author:
When courts have referred to the proportionate share of expenses to be borne by the
secured creditor they apparently assume that the benefit derived by the secured credi-
tor from the sale is equivalent to the amount of secured credit over the value of the
security. Thus, if the secured debt is 9/10 of the value of the secured asset, the
creditor would realize 9/10 of the benefit of the sale and should pay 9/10 of the
attendant costs.
Presley, Note, supra note 13, at 1099 n.38. Using the example in the text, suppose a buyer
would pay $100 for collateral, and a secured creditor claims $90 before transaction costs. The
Note author suggests that the general creditors bear 1/10 of the cost for the secured creditor-
a subsidy because the debtor would have borne 100 percent of the expense had there been no
bankruptcy. Id.
Sometimes a secured creditor consents to pro rata sharing. Such agreements are enforcea-
ble. See Federal Land Bank v. Belew (In re Belew), 44 B.R. 12, 13-14 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984)
(Brelend, J.).
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context, no secured creditor's seniority is being compromised for the ben-
efit of some junior claimant.26
This is not to say that section 506(c) expenses are subordinate to
secured claims. It should be understood that section 506(c) is a superpri-
ority.2 7 Thus, in the above example, of the $100 in cash proceeds ob-
tained by the trustee, the trustee's $4 expense has first priority, the
secured creditor's $95 comes second, and the remaining $1 is debtor eq-
uity that goes to the bankrupt estate. In other words, the 506(c) expense
takes priority over the secured claim it invades, but the secured claim
itself is not reduced until the debtor equity has disappeared.28
The requirement that debtor equity be exhausted before the trustee
can invade the secured claim raises another very difficult issue. If the
trustee claims both general administrative expenses29 and section 506(c)
expenses, may the trustee raid debtor equity for general purposes and
later claim that her 506(c) expenses must now reduce the allowed se-
cured claim? In the above hypothetical scenario, where the trustee owns
debtor equity worth $5, suppose the trustee has already spent this
26. See Equitable Gas Co. v. Equibank, N.A. (In re McKeesport Steel Castings Co.), 799
F.2d 91, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Olympia Holding Corp., 127 B.R. 478, 480 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1991) (Proctor, J.); In re MMS Builders, Inc., 101 B.R. 426, 429 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989)
(Fisher, J.); In re Richards Pontiac, Inc., 24 B.R. 758, 760-61 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (Hall,
J.). But see John Deskins Pic Pac, Inc. v. Flat Top National Bank (In re John Deskins Pic
Pac, Inc.), 59 B.R. 809 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986) (Pearson, J.), in which a Chapter 7 trustee had
rent obligations on store space and successfully charged all of it to the secured creditor because
collateral was stored there. Id. at 814. Yet the premises were used for other purposes as well.
Id. This was a case in which proration would have been just.
An early pitch for general sharing of expenses between secured and unsecured creditors
occurs in Seymour J. Rubin, Allocation of Reorganization Expenses, 51 YALE L.J. 418 (1942).
In this article Rubin argues that reorganization is for the benefit of both secured and unsecured
creditors. See id. at 427. Therefore, undersecured creditors should assume a share of the
trustee's expenses according to a ratio of encumbered assets to total assets. Id. at 430. When
the secured creditor is undersecured, such a proposal is consistent with what the text has just
suggested. Since the trustee is a hypothetical lien creditor as to assets not encumbered by
claims of the secured creditors, Rubin's ratio reflects the proposition that the trustee's actions
simultaneously benefits different lien creditors claiming different collateral. Rubin does not
offer advice about allocating expenses when the secured creditor is oversecured, but his princi-
ple-that reorganization is partly for the benefit of secured creditors-leads to the conclusion
that pro rata sharing is appropriate nevertheless. Whether the bankrupt estate consists of
debtor equity or separate assets should not affect his argument. In this sense, I take issue in
this Article with Rubin, who would uphold the pro rata cases criticized in the text above.
27. See Warren v. Palmer, 310 U.S. 132, 136 (1940) (Reed, J.) (interpreting Bankruptcy
Act § 77(c)(6)); In re Trenge, 127 B.R. 552, 555 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (Pollack, J.).
28. Cf. Acceptance Assocs. of Am., Inc. v. Zimmerman (In re H.P. Tool Mfg. Corp.), 12
B.R. 600, 601 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981). In H.P. Tool, Judge Goldhaber awarded first priority to
the secured claim, second to postpetition interest under § 506(b), and then to 506(c) expenses.
Id. at 601-02. But, as cash proceeds were sufficient to pay all these claims, this priority can
conveniently be dismissed as dictum.
29. That is, expenses not properly chargeable to the secured creditor under § 506(c).
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amount on her lawyers.3" Only after the equity cushion is depleted does
the t ustee seek 506(c) expenses of $4 from the secured creditor. If the
trustee had charged the 506(c) amount first, the secured claim would not
have been reduced. But since the trustee dissipated the debtor equity
first, a reduction of the secured claim becomes possible.
If the trustee can pull off this stunt, then criticism of the setoff cases
or the pro rata rule is useless. The trustee can always invade the secured
claim so long as the trustee is careful to dissipate debtor equity before the
section 506(c) charge. Indeed, the failure of a trustee to accomplish a
raid on debtor equity might well constitute a breach of fiduciary duty to
the general creditors.
A marshalling rule might be developed to require the trustee to
charge the 506(c) expenses first and any other expenses second. This
kind of rule would protect the secured claim against trustee predation,
but it is tantamount to reserving part of the surplus for the secured credi-
tor. To put it another way, whenever debtor equity exists, a marshalling
rule implies that the secured creditor has the right to insist that the eq-
uity be adequately protected against depreciation, so that equity will exist
to soak up expected 506(c) expenses of the trustee.3
There is at least one objection to preserving debtor equity for the
trustee's unaccrued collection expenses. If equity must be preserved for
this purpose, then secured parties will be able to expropriate the equity as
the secured creditor's postpetition interest and collection expenses accrue
under section 506(b).3 2 Although some courts do hold that debtor equity
must be reserved in case 506(b) entitlements accrue,3 3 the better view is
that the secured creditor cannot, for this reason, prevent a trustee from
30. See 11 U.S.C. § 331 (1988) (permitting interim compensation to lawyers).
31. For cases arguably following such a rule, see General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Peltz (In re
Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.), 762 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1985) (Van Graafeiland, J.) (refusing a
506(c) award where debtor equity was dissipated); In re Dixie-Shamrock Oil & Gas, Inc., 39
B.R. 115, 118 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (Paine, J.) (requiring that surplus cash collateral be
spent only on maintaining the collateral).
32. But in a case where § 506(c) expenses are incurred, the two equity preservation rules
might cancel each other out. Suppose that the collateral is worth $100, and the secured credi-
tor claims $90 at the time of the petition. The secured creditor is entitled to 10% interest
under § 506(b). The bankruptcy proceeding is expected to last a year. Therefore, the entire
equity cushion of $10 must be preserved so that one year's interest can accrue against it. But
now suppose that the trustee has $5 in 506(c) expense. The trustee may now invade the se-
cured claim because there is effectively no debtor equity left in the collateral.
33. See Hamilton Bank v. Diaconx Corp. (In re Diaconx Corp.), 69 B.R. 333, 341-43
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (Fox, J.) (holding that undersecured creditor could have postpetition
interest and collection costs because equity cushion existed at the start of bankruptcy); see also
In re D.W.G.K. Restaurants, Inc., 84 B.R. 684, 686 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1988) (Hargrove, J.)
(arguing in dictum that secured creditor has a contractual right to see debtor equity
preserved).
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using property of the estate such as debtor equity.34
Therefore, if a marshalling rule is instituted, it should be severely
limited to the following principle: If debtor equity still exists at the time
a trustee wishes to recover an expense within the scope of section 506(c),
the trustee must first use this equity to pay 506(c) expenses. If no equity
exists at that time, then the secured claim may be invaded under the
auspices of section 506(c). Obviously, this rule sends less than satisfac-
tory signals to a bankruptcy trustee, but it is the best rule logic and con-
sistency can offer at present.
At a higher level of generality, it might be asked whether the prior-
ity implied by section 506(c) is advisable, or whether it would be better if
the trustee were prohibited from invading the secured claim to recover
expenses. It may be universally true, as was said earlier, that enforcing
officers have the top priority for their expenses.35 But it must also be
admitted that the predominant pattern is for the enforcing lien creditor to
invoke the services of the enforcing officer. In bankruptcy, the enforcing
lien creditor is the junior lienor-the bankruptcy trustee36-- not the se-
nior secured creditor. Whereas under state law the senior liens are typi-
cally not foreclosable for the benefit of junior lien creditors, 37 in
bankruptcy the junior trustee can foreclose senior secured creditors.38
For example, assume that three lien creditors, A, B, and C, are first, sec-
ond, and third in line for a given piece of collateral. Under state law, if B
wishes to foreclose, B can generally foreclose C, but not A. That is, any
buyer of the collateral takes subject to A's lien, but takes free of C's lien.
In other words, the foreclosure sale has no legal effect on A whatsoever.
Therefore, if the enforcing officer overspends, it harms B or C. Over-
spending cannot adversely affect A.
Bankruptcy is different. The trustee is a junior lien creditor who can
cause a senior lien creditor to be foreclosed.39 As such, the trustee can
make the senior lien creditors pay the enforcement bill. This exportation
of costs from the junior to the senior lien creditor in bankruptcy is sel-
dom allowed under state law.
34. See In re Triplett, 87 B.R. 25, 27 (Bankr. W.D. Texas 1988) (secured creditor had no
right to complain that the debtor-in-possession was using the equity cushion); Carlson, supra
note 21, at 389-91.
35. See supra text accompanying note 12.
36. See I1 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1988) (trustee has the rights of a judicial lien creditor).
37. See U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (1972). But see David Gray Carlson, Death and Subordination
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Senior Buyers and Senior Lien Creditors, 5
CARDOZO L. REv. 547, 565-71 (1984) (describing exceptions).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 363(0(3) (1988).
39. Id.
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The argument against this state of affairs would emphasize the fact
that the trustee ought to have the incentive to deal with the collateral
only when the general creditors would benefit. That is, only when the
bankrupt estate increases by more than the administrative expenses of
dealing with the collateral should the trustee be dealing with the collat-
eral at all. If this principle were followed, then the value added by the
trustee should always be sufficient to cover these administrative expenses.
It should never be necessary to reimburse the trustee out of the allowed
secured claim. A repeal of section 506(c) would therefore encourage the
trustee to spend only when the general creditors would benefit.
Still, such a rule would leave the trustee exposed in the case of good
faith enterprises gone awry. Protection of the trustee's business judg-
ment comprises a powerful argument in favor of section 506(c). Whether
this argument prevails depends upon the degree of confidence held in
bankruptcy trustees-whether they adhere to their fiduciary duties (in
which case section 506(c) is advisable) or whether they generally do not
(so that economic incentives are needed to insure proper behavior). This
latter pessimistic view supports the repeal of section 506(c).
Even if section 506(c) has no right to exist, it nevertheless does so,
for the time being. Accordingly, 506(c) expenses must be accorded a
priority above any claim by a secured creditor. But if a positive debtor
equity exists, then this equity must absorb 506(c) expenses before the
secured claim may be reduced in size.
B. Standing
The foregoing discussion establishes the trustee's priority for 506(c)
expenses. Can a claimant other than the trustee who has benefitted the
secured creditor take over this priority and bring suit directly against the
secured creditor? Or must the trustee be the person seeking compensa-
tion under section 506(c)? Section 506(c) mentions only recoveries by
the trustee herself, not recoveries by others acting for the trustee.
Courts are split on this question.' The cases that permit only the
40. See generally Savage, supra note 13, at 435-36 ("The courts are still applying the pre-
Code theories on a case by case basis, using individual passages of the 506(c) language to
justify whatever conclusion they reach."). For a liberal standing rule, see New Orleans Pub.
Serv., Inc. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Delta Towers, Ltd.), 924 F.2d 74, 76-77 (1 1th
Cir. 1991) (Johnson, J.); Equitable Gas Co. v. Equibank, N.A. (In re McKeesport Steel Cast-
ings Co.), 799 F.2d 91, 93-94 (3d Cir. 1986) (Higginbotham, J.). For the rule that only the
trustee has standing, see In re Scopetta-Senra Partnership III, 127 B.R. 282, 283-84 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1991) (Cristol, J.); In re Proto-Specialties, Inc., 43 B.R. 81, 83 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1984)
(Nielsen, J.). Some courts have specifically stated that attorneys lack standing to recover fees
under § 506. See In re Manchester Hides, Inc., 32 B.R. 629, 632-33 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983)
(Thinnes, J.); In re Codesco, 18 B.R. 225, 230 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Schwartzberg, J.). One
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trustee to seek 506(c) expenses from secured creditors, however, seem ill-
advised. Suppliers can easily arrange for the trustee to make the motion
for them. Such a rule only forces suppliers into useless procedural
maneuvers.
The liberal view of standing-that claimants other than the trustee
can collect 506(c) expenses directly from the secured creditor-is re-
flected in a case some authorities have identified as the origin of section
506(c). In New York Dock Co. v. The Steamship Poznan,41 Justice Stone
wrote,
The most elementary notion of justice would seem to require
that services or property furnished upon the authority of the
court or its officer, acting within his authority, for the common
benefit of those interested in a fund administered by the court,
should be paid from the fund as an "expense of justice."'4
This sentiment certainly implies that the name of the movant is irrele-
vant, so long as the service to the "common fund" was necessary and
proper.
Of course, suppliers ought to have standing under section 506(c)
only when the trustee owes the expense to the suppliers. For example, in
In re Proto-Specialties, Inc.,43 the debtor's landlord was not permitted to
share in the recovery of storage expenses incurred after the landlord suc-
cessfully evicted the bankrupt estate from his premises.4' Once evicted,
the trustee owed no rent to the landlord. Hence, the landlord properly
was excluded from section 506(c) recovery because post-eviction rent was
not an expense the trustee owed the landlord.
In contrast, a junior secured creditor in In re Landing Associates45
paid off a senior lien creditor and then sought reimbursement out of the
proceeds of the secured creditor's own collateral." The senior lien credi-
tor was a nonrecourse tax creditor,4' so that the trustee did not, properly
speaking, owe the senior lien creditor anything, in the in personam sense.
Nevertheless, the junior secured creditor should have had standing to
recover from its own collateral under section 506(c), even though the
court has held that another secured creditor has standing to impose § 506(c) expenses on other
secured parties. In re Stable Mews Assocs., 49 B.R. 395, 398 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Busch-
man, J.), appeal dismissed, 778 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1985).
41. 274 U.S. 117 (1927). On these claims of origin, see supra note 13.
42. New York Dock, 274 U.S. at 121.
43. 43 B.R. 81 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1984) (Nielsen, J.).
44. Id. at 83.
45. 122 B.R. 288 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (Clark, J.).
46. Id. at 298.
47. See id.
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trustee had no liability for the senior tax claim. To see why this is so,
some background assumptions should be set forth.
First, since the junior secured creditor was undersecured, its claim
was subject to subdivision under section 506(a) into its secured and un-
secured parts. The security interest for the unsecured deficit would be
void under section 506(d). For example, suppose the senior tax lien was
for $15, the total claim by the junior secured creditor was $100, and the
collateral was worth $90 if unencumbered. On these numbers, the junior
secured creditor would have a secured claim of $75 and an unsecured
claim of $25. The security interest for the $25 unsecured deficit is
deemed void under section 506(d),4" but is preserved for the benefit of the
estate under Bankruptcy Code section 551. 4 When the junior secured
creditor pays the tax lien, the junior secured creditor continues to have
an $75 secured claim, but now there is $15 in new debtor equity that is
encumbered by the trustee's avoided-but-preserved lien for $25. So far,
the junior secured creditor has obtained no direct benefit from paying the
senior tax lien, but the trustee's lien is benefited by $15. The junior se-
cured creditor therefore should have a valid 506(c) claim against the
trustee, who is a secured creditor benefited by payment of the tax.5 0
In fact, the identical result should be reached even without the aid
of section 506(c). It is possible to view the junior secured creditor as
having taken an assignment of the senior lien, which could then be as-
serted against the collateral, regardless of section 506(c). Nothing in the
Bankruptcy Code requires that the bankruptcy court approve assign-
ments of secured claims in advance.5"
In Landing Associates, however, Judge Leif Clark erroneously disal-
lowed reimbursement to the junior secured creditor (now senior), be-
cause the buyout constituted postpetition credit without the court's
consent. 52 There was no reason for Judge Clark to view this as a case of
illegally tendered postpetition credit, because the junior secured credi-
tor's claim did not burden the bankrupt estate one iota. Rather, the facts
in Landing Associates illustrate how the "standing" controversy under
48. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988).
49. Id § 551.
50. Cf. Tycon I Bldg. Ltd. Partnership v. County of Fairfax (In re Tycon I Bldg. Ltd.
Partnership), 129 B.R. 78, 80-81 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991) (Tice, J.) (allowing a debtor-in-pos-
session 506(c) compensation for expense in reducing size of tax lien in a way that benefited
junior secured creditor).
51. Landing Assocs., 122 B.R. at 298. Bankruptcy Rule 3001(e) only requires that notice
of an assignment of a claim be filed, and even then only if the proof of claim had already been
filed by the assignor. See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Trading Claims and Tak-
ing Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 21-22 (1990).
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) (1988) (requiring court approval for postpetition credit).
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section 506(c) resembles assignments of secured claims. If a trustee has a
right to charge the collateral, and if a third creditor "buys" this claim,
the third creditor should be allowed to enforce what amounts to a senior
lien on the collateral.
C. "Prom Property"
Whereas the previous section discusses who may be a plaintiff under
section 506(c), there is also an issue as to who may be a defendant. Sec-
tion 506(c) provides that the trustee may recover certain expenses "from
property. '53 Typically this is precisely what happens: the trustee sells
the property54 or collects an account receivable 5 and then seeks permis-
sion to take a cash amount equal to the trustee's expense. But what hap-
pens if the property has already been abandoned? Or what if the
property is to be used in a reorganization? In these circumstances, the
trustee has not reduced the property into cash. Does the requirement
that the trustee recover "from property" bar in personam suits against
the secured creditor?
Apparently not. Courts have not hesitated to impose in personam
liability on secured creditors to whom property has been abandoned, 6
even when the secured creditor was not required to sell and foreclose the
collateral.57 This seems entirely appropriate. Whether the trustee's right
to section 506(c) expenses is characterized as a lien or-as 506(c)'s admi-
ralty ancestor was characterized-an equitable charge on property,58 se-
cured creditors who take abandoned property convert the trustee's
53. Id § 506(c).
54. See, eg., Equitable Gas Co. v. Equibank, N.A. (In re McKeesport Steel Castings Co.),
799 F.2d 91, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1986) (Higginbotham, J.); Schindler v. Sharak (In re Salzman), 83
B.R. 233, 240-41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Schwartzberg, J.).
55. See, eg., In re Johnson, 47 B.R. 204, 205 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985) (Martin, J.); Com-
munication & Studies Int'l, Ltd. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A. (In re World of English, N.V.),
21 B.R. 524, 527 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (Drake, J.).
56. In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 298-99 (7th Cir. 1982) (Swygert, J.); In re AFCO
Enters., Inc., 35 B.R. 512, 517-18 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983) (Clark, J.).
57. In re P.C., Ltd., 110 B.R. 232, 235 (E.D. La. 1990) (Arceneaux, J.) (because collateral
was transferred to the secured creditor as an "asset payment," creditor had no obligation
under state law to sell the property, yet trustee could still recover personally from the creditor
under § 506(c)).
58. In developing a rule like § 506(c) for admiralty, Justice Stone thought charges of this
sort should not be called liens. See New York Dock Co. v. The S.S. Poznan, 274 U.S. 117, 121
(1927). "Such preferential payments are mere incidents to the judicial administration of a
fund," he wrote. "They are not to be explained in terms, of equitable liens in the technical
sense ... ." Id.
The implications of this venerable dictum are far from clear. See GRANT GILMORE &
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 603-05 (2d ed. 1975) (speculating on
what this dictum might mean for admiralty lien foreclosures).
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property to their own use, in the tortious sense. Under a theory of con-
version, secured creditors have an in personam liability to a bankruptcy
trustee.
Nevertheless, several points can be derived from section 506(c)'s ref-
erence to a trustee's recovery "from property." First, the limitation of
recovery "from property" ought to mean that the maximum exposure of
a secured creditor is the value of the property. That is, section 506(c)
might justify the complete loss of all value from the collateral, but it
cannot justify surcharging the secured creditor for amounts above and
beyond its value. Otherwise, the trustee is not only recovering "from
property," but "from property" and from the secured creditor's own
pockets as well.
This principle may come in handy with regard to environmental
claims which, these days, can far exceed the value of the collateral itself.
Secured creditors are supposed to be immune from the liability imposed
by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA) on "owners" of toxic waste facilities.5 9 The inter-
pretation given to the words "from property" serves to make clear that
the maximum liability of a secured creditor for toxic waste liability is the
value of the property. In other words, section 506(c) might include toxic
waste cleanup expenses, but the secured creditor is, in essence, a nonre-
course creditor vis-A-vis CERCLA plaintiffs.'
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988) (generally excluding secured creditors from defi-
nition of "owner" of a "facility"); id § 9607(a)(1) (rendering an "owner of a facility" liable for
toxic waste cleanup).
60. It is possible, however, that § 506(c) applies to secured creditors, if the secured credi-
tor is "benefited" by toxic waste cleanup. Anyone who buys a "facility" becomes liable for
cleanup. Id. § 9607(a)(1). Therefore, a buyer will discount her bid for collateral by the ex-
pected amount of cleanup. See David Gray Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy: Some
Unifying Themes of Intertemporal Creditor Priorities Created by Running Covenants, Products
Liability and Toxic Waste Cleanup, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 151-56 (1987). When
the property has been decontaminated, the collateral buyers will bid more for the property.
This extra value is "benefit" within the meaning of § 506(c).-In re Better-Brite Plating, Inc.,
105 B.R. 912, 918 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989) (Ihlenfeldt, J.) (granting EPA "administrative
expense liens with priority over secured creditors to the proceeds of any sale of the property
subsequent to decontamination").
In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985), is an example of
no benefit to the secured creditor, who claimed a security interest in all personal property,
including barrels of sodium monochloride-property that had no value, because disposal costs
outweighed its worth. Id. at 288. The secured creditor had auctioned off other, valuable per-
sonal property. Id. Thereafter, the EPA removed the toxic barrels and sought to recover from
the secured creditor under § 506(c). Id. Judge White properly ruled that the charge did not
"benefit" the secured creditor. Id. at 287-88. If the EPA cleanup had made the barrels valua-
ble-for instance, if a buyer would now pay $100 for well-scrubbed barrels-the EPA would
be able to recover its prodigious cleanup costs "from property"-that is, from the $100. But
the secured creditor would have no personal liability beyond that amount.
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Second, if section 506(c) authorizes in personam liability for secured
creditors, only secured parties of the debtor should be charged. This re-
quirement seems obvious, but it can become confusing in cases involving
security interests on leased property. For example, when a secured credi-
tor claims a security interest in the reversionary interest of property, but
not in the leasehold, and when the lessee is bankrupt, the trustee should
not be able to reach the secured creditor, because the secured creditor's
security interest does not encumber property of the bankrupt estate. But
when the security interest encumbers the leasehold only, or both the
leasehold and the reversionary interest, then a charge is appropriate, be-
cause the leasehold in the bankrupt estate is encumbered by the secured
creditor's interest.61 In this latter case, actions to preserve the property
are for the joint benefit of the lessor and the secured creditor. This joint
benefit suggests that some sort of apportionment of the expense is appro-
priate, so that the secured creditor does not have to bear the entire
expense.62
Third, "from property" ought to mean that the trustee cannot col-
lect from the secured creditor until the collateral is liquidated or aban-
doned. Until the collateral is liquidated (or converted to the secured
creditor's own use), the trustee's charge on the collateral is still incho-
ate-not yet mature. Thus, in In re Beker Industries Corp.,63 Judge
Buschman prohibited abandonment of the collateral, but indicated that
section 506(c) expenses could be collected only if and when the collateral
was finally abandoned.64 This principle, if applied in Chapter 11, sug-
gests that the debtor-in-possession cannot collect until the plan is con-
firmed. At that time, if the secured creditor is to be crammed down,
compensation to the debtor-in-possession could come in the form of low-
ering the valuation of the secured claim and raising the amount of the
unsecured deficit.
Hence, even though the words "from property" have not altogether
barred in personam suits against secured creditors, they do indicate
whether specific secured creditors are liable, the limit of a secured credi-
tor's liability, and when this liability becomes mature and presently
owing.
61. In re Olympia Holding Corp., 127 B.R. 478, 480-81 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (Proc-
tor, J.) (encumbered truck leased to corporate subsidiary).
62. But see id. at 482 ("The Trustee is not required to show that the marshalling was for
the sole and exclusive benefit of [the secured creditor] in order to be entitled to a surcharge
under section 506(c).").
63. 64 B.R. 900 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
64. Id. at 908-10.
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D. The Effect of a 506(c) Charge on the Secured Creditor's Unsecured
Deficit Claim
Suppose a court awards 506(c) expenses to the trustee or her subro-
gee. What is the effect of this award on the secured creditor's total claim
in bankruptcy? Section 506(c), of course, implies that a creditor is un-
dersecured. As was stated earlier, section 506(c) exists solely to invade
the secured claim, 65 and this can occur only when there is no equity
cushion in the collateral. Hence, section 506(c) makes itself relevant only
when the total claim of the secured creditor exceeds the value of the
collateral.
According to section 506(a), the claim of an undersecured creditor
must be divided into two separate claims-a wholly secured claim and a
wholly unsecured claim.66 Expenses awarded under section 506(c) are
awarded "from the property." Does this award reduce the secured claim
and raise the unsecured claim simultaneously? Or does the award simply
reduce the secured claim and leave the unsecured deficit intact? No judi-
cial or academic opinion has been hazarded on this question. The answer
depends on precisely how one characterizes a 506(c) charge-a charac-
terization likely to be controversial.
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercia Code, it is clear that an
analogous charge increases the deficit claim the secured creditor is enti-
tled to recover from the debtor. According to section 9-504(1):
A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise
dispose of any or all of the collateral in its then condition or
following any commercially reasonable preparation or process-
ing.... The proceeds of disposition shall be applied in the or-
der following to
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing
for sale or lease, selling, leasing and the like and, to the extent
provided for in the agreement and not prohibited by law, the
reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred by the
secured party;
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security
interest under which the disposition is made;
(c) [to junior secured parties and finally to the debtor].67
Under this provision, expenses analogous to 506(c) charges would de-
crease the recovery from the collateral and would increase the unsecured
deficit. For example, suppose collateral is sold for $80, and the secured
65. See supra text accompanying notes 12-39.
66. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
67. U.C.C. § 9-504(l) (1972).
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creditor claims $100. The expenses of sale are $5. Section 9-504(1)(a)
authorizes the secured creditor to take out $5 before any of its claim is
extinguished by payment. Thus, from the collateral, $75 is available to
pay the secured creditor's claim. The deficit is $25.
Transposed to the bankruptcy courts, this principle allows the se-
cured creditor to claim a larger deficit if the collateral is invaded to cover
the trustee's 506(c) expenses. The payment of these expenses is not the
payment of the secured creditor's claim. To the extent the collateral does
not pay this claim, the secured creditor should have a deficit unsecured
claim.
A passage from United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Associates68 arguably requires that the unsecured portion of the claim be
left intact, even while the secured claim is reduced.69 Timbers dealt with
a much different issue-whether the right of adequate protection in-
cludes the right of undersecured creditors to receive postpetition inter-
est.70 Writing about the meaning of section 506(a), Justice Scalia
contended that undersecured creditors must not have the right to inter-
est.71 Otherwise,
the "value of such creditor's interest" would increase, and the
proportions of the claim that are secured and unsecured would
alter, as the stay continues-since the value of the entitlement
to use the collateral from the date of bankruptcy would rise
with the passage of time. No one suggests this was intended.72
This formulation can be criticized for a certain lack of intelligibility. 3
Nevertheless, the words of U.S. Supreme Court justices are often taken
very seriously, for better or worse, even when they are dictum. The
68. 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
69. See id. at 373-74.
70. Id. at 369.
71. Id. at 371.
72. Id. at 372.
73. To quote my own critique of this interpretation of § 506(c):
It may be observed that, over time, the face amount of the secured claim will increase
if interest is allowed to accrue, but face amount is economically meaningless. Value
is what counts in financial markets, and Section 361 calls for protection of value. If
face amount is allowed to increase by the accrual of postpetition interest, the value of
the secured claim (as of today) may stay the same, if the right interest rate is chosen.
It will not necessarily increase, as Scalia suggests. The change in the face amount of
a claim is inevitable if the value of the claim is to be protected. In arguing that
postpetition interest entitlements change the value of an undersecured creditor's
claim, Scalia confounds the concept of value and face amount and therefore has not
developed a strong argument for his view that undersecured creditors have no
postpetition interest entitlement to interest.
Carlson, supra note 1, at 603.
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words just quoted, for example, have already been taken to mean that
collateral must be valued at the time a bankruptcy petition is filed 74 -a
very controversial proposition.7" The theory of this holding appears to
be that if another time for valuation is chosen, the stated ratio changes
over time, in violation of Scalia's theorem.
If we stipulate the importance of a fixed ratio between the secured
and unsecured claims of an undersecured creditor, then section 506(c)
should have no effect on the unsecured claim. Rather, the expenses come
out of the fund reserved for the secured claim without any readjustment
of the ratio between the secured and unsecured claim. For example, sup-
pose the secured creditor claims $100, but the collateral is valued at $80.
The ratio of secured to unsecured claims is four to one. Now suppose
that the court awards the trustee $5 in 506(c) expenses. The award af-
fects neither the unsecured claim nor the secured claim, except that the
secured creditor does not get the full claim. Instead the secured claim
remains at $80, but with $5 going to the trustee. The secured creditor
receives $75 from the collateral and the usual dividend on the $20 un-
secured claim. Meanwhile, the ratio of four to one is maintained.
A final doubt must be expressed regarding this fixed ratio of secured
to unsecured claims. If cash proceeds come into the estate, a secured
creditor's lien attaches to them, if the prepetition security agreement so
provides.76 The continued ownership of proceeds guarantees that the ra-
tio of secured to unsecured debt cannot be maintained in any case involv-
ing overencumbered income-producing collateral." Similarly, if the
secured debt is paid down over time, which section 361(1) clearly permits
by way of adequate protection," the ratio is destroyed. Thus, the Scalian
ratio violates the clear meaning of the Bankruptcy Code and, on this
74. In re Flagler-at-First Assocs., 101 B.R. 372, 377 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989) (Cristol, J.).
75. See David Gray Carlson, Time, Value, and the Rights of Secured Creditors in Bank-
ruptcy, or, When Does Adequate Protection Begin?, 1 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 113, 127-28 (1991);
Patrick Fitzgerald, Comment, Bankruptcy Code Section 506(a) and Undersecured Creditors:
What Date for Valuation?, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1953, 1958 (1987).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988).
77. Although this theory has been overlooked, it ought to be that an undersecured credi-
tor has only very limited rights to cash proceeds under § 552(b). First, the legislative history
to § 552 indicates that proceeds should not have the effect of improving an undersecured credi-
tor's position. See infra text accompanying notes 82-85. Second, the undersecured creditor's
deficit claim is no longer secured at all, by virtue of § 506(d) avoidance.
Nevertheless, it is still true that the proceeds, as they come in, are cash collateral within
the meaning of § 552(b). If the cash can no longer go to secure the heretofore unsecured
deficit, at least the proceeds constitute an equity cushion for the secured claim the under-
secured creditor continues to have under § 506(a). Against this equity cushion postpetition
interest and collection expenses might accrue. This theory is explored in greater detail in
Carlson, supra note 75, at 128-31.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (1988).
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basis, might be disregarded. If so, a bankruptcy court might still increase
the unsecured claim for every dollar of 506(c) compensation to a
trustee.79 In a case involving dividends to unsecured creditors (which do
occur from time to time), such a right to an increased unsecured deficit is
important.
E. Charging Secured Creditors Without the Aid of Section 506(c)
As the previous discussion has shown, section 506(c) exists to justify
the invasion of the secured claim by the trustee.8 0 But section 506(c)
expressly requires a demonstration that the expenses being reimbursed
actually benefited the secured creditor whose claim is being invaded.
Some courts are hostile to the idea that any reorganization proceeding
benefits a secured creditor."' Given such an attitude, it will be very diffi-
cult indeed to bring the general expenses of bankruptcy administration
within the scope of section 506(c). It becomes relevant, then, to look at
other ways that a trustee might invade a secured claim without the aid of
section 506(c).
1. Disencumbering Cash Proceeds Under Section 552(b)
Section 552(b) provides that a secured creditor with the prepetition
right to cash proceeds continues to have the right to postpetition pro-
ceeds, "except to any extent that the court ... orders otherwise."82 Ac-
cording to the legislative history, "[t]he provision allows the court to
consider the equities in each case. In the course of such consideration,
the court may evaluate any expenditures by the estate relating to pro-
ceeds and any related improvement in position of the secured party."83
In In re Cerrico Realty Corp.,84 Judge Duberstein expressed the view
that section 552(b) authorizes the use of cash collateral without the con-
sent of the secured creditor although, on the facts before him, he was
unwilling to authorize use without better evidence on the nature of the
79. Ironically, Justice Scalia used the integrity of § 552 to bolster his position that under-
secured creditors should not get postpetition interest. In his view, postpetition interest was
like rent on collateral. See United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S.
365, 374 (1988). This is a dubious assertion. Section 552 requires an agreement to reserve a
lien on rents. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988). Scalia thought that an automatic right to postpeti-
tion interest would produce "rent" even when an agreement did not provide for it. Timbers,
484 U.S. at 374.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 12-39.
81. These cases are discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 256-72.
82. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b).
83. 124 CONG. Rlc. 32,400 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
84. 127 B.R. 319 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991).
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expenditures.8 5 Yet it is hard to believe that the standards for expendi-
tures under section 552(b) are different from the standards under section
506(c). The thrust of the legislative history is that the right to postpeti-
tion cash proceeds should not become a vehicle whereby a secured credi-
tor improves her position. This strongly suggests that the trustee
expenditures referred to are nothing else but the expenditures properly
chargeable to the secured creditors under section 506(c). Such expendi-
tures, if not charged to the secured creditor, would tend to improve the
secured creditor's position. In addition, the trustee's expenditures to be
examined must relate to the cash proceeds generated by those expendi-
tures. Hence, it is far from clear that section 552(b)'s legislative history
adds anything not already implicit in section 506(c).
2. The Effect of Interim Compensation to Lawyers and Accountants
on Secured Creditors
Another theory by which secured creditors can be made to bear the
ordinary expenses of bankruptcy administration-without reference to
section 506(c)-states that administrative expenses might outrank a se-
cured claim whenever they are awarded as interim compensation to law-
yers and accountants under Bankruptcy Code sections 330 and 331.86
This suggestion has some support in the case law,87 but the weight of
authority is heavily against it.88
Of course, postpetition creditors who aid in the administration of
the estate89 are entitled to a very high priority vis-a-vis other general
creditors.90 But secured creditors are supposed to outrank these admin-
istrative claims.91 Unless the trustee's expense can be brought under sec-
85. Id. at 323-24.
86. 11 U.S.C. §§ 330, 331 (1988).
87. See In re Callister, 15 B.R. 521 (Bankr D. Utah 1981), appeal dismissed, 673 F.2d 305
(10th Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Callister, 13 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) 21 (10th Cir. 1984). For a full discussion of Callister, see infra notes 104-09 and ac-
companying text.
88. See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
89. See 11 U.S.C. § 503 (1988) (describing the rules for qualifying for this high priority).
90. Id. § 507(a)(1).
91. In Chapter 7 cases, the superpriority of secured creditors to administrative creditors
follows from the fact that secured creditors are entitled to distributions under Bankruptcy
Code § 725; administrative creditors obtain distributions under § 726(a), which, by the terms
of § 725, takes effect only after the § 725 distributions have already occurred. Id. § 725. In
Chapter 11, dissenting secured creditors must always be given the value of their collateral. Id.
§ 1129(b)(2)(A). Administrative creditors have the right to be paid in cash and in full. Id.
§ 1129(a)(9)(A). 'Hence, a plan that cannot cover both the secured claims and the administra-
tive claims cannot be confirmed and must convert to Chapter 7, where secured creditors come
first.
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tion 506(c), secured creditors should be held harmless from expenses of
the bankrupt estate.92 This much is obvious-when collateral is ade-
quate to satisfy the secured claim. If the collateral has disappeared, the
secured creditors are given a superpriority even higher than the priority
of administrative claimants.93 This superpriority is useless if the estate
has no assets left; when unencumbered assets do exist, however, secured
creditors deprived of their collateral outrank any administrative creditor.
Most administrative creditors are not paid until the estate is liqui-
dated or a reorganization plan is confirmed.94 There are, however, at
least two very important exceptions to this principle. First, the trustee
may expend unencumbered funds in the ordinary course of business. 95
Second, trustees, their lawyers, and their "professional person[s]" are en-
titled to interim compensation during the pendency of the proceeding.96
This interim compensation ought not to be a threat to secured credi-
tors.97 Interim compensation may only be awarded out of property of
92. In re Energy Coop., Inc., 55 B.R. 957, 964 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (Hertz, J.) ("If at
the end of the case, there are no assets from which to pay administrative expenses beyond
those subject to a valid secured claim, the professional is forced to forego compensation unless
he can demonstrate that he has met the standards of section 506(c).").
93. 11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (1988). According to this provision:
If the trustee... provides adequate protection of the interest of a holder of a claim
secured by a lien on property of the debtor and if, notwithstanding such protection,
such creditor has a claim allowable under subsection (a)(1) of this section arising
from the stay of action against such property under section 362 of this title, from the
use, sale, or lease of such property under section 363 of this title, or from the granting
of a lien under section 364(d) of this title, then such creditor's claim under such
subsection shall have priority over every other claim allowable under such
subsection.
Id.
94. In re Callister, 15 B.R. 521, 534 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (Mabey, J.), appeal dismissed,
673 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Ingersall-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Callister, 13 Bankr.
Ct. Dec. (CRR) 21 (10th Cir. 1984).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (1988). The trustee's power to expend funds in the ordinary
course of business is assumed in any Chapter 11 case, unless the court orders otherwise. Id.
§ 1108.
96. Id. §§ 330, 331. According to § 331,
[a] trustee, an examiner, a debtor's attorney, or any professional person em-
ployed under section 327 or 1103 of this title may apply to the court not more than
once every 120 days after an order for relief in a case under this title, or more often if
the court permits, for such compensation for services rendered before the date of
such an application or reimbursement for expenses incurred before such date as is
provided under section 330 of this title. After notice and a hearing, the court may
allow and disburse to such applicant such compensation or reimbursement.
Id. § 331.
97. Nor is the payment of interim compensation a threat to other administrative claim-
ants. In In re IML Freight, Inc., 52 B.R. 124 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985), Judge Glen Clark ruled
that the right to interim compensation does not mean that professional persons had a higher
priority than the standard administrative claimant. Id. at 140. Hence, Judge Clark denied
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the estate. Or, to be more precise, a secured creditor's collateral may be
used to pay the trustee's lawyers only if the secured creditor consents98
or the security interest receives adequate protection.99 For example, the
cash collateral might be replaced with equivalent illiquid collateral.'
The point is that, ultimately, the bankrupt estate should bear the cost of
professional services, unless those services directly benefit the secured
creditor and hence qualify as 506(c) expenses.
If interim compensation has been awarded, and if collateral later
dissipates to such a degree that secured creditors have been denied ade-
quate protection for their security interests, any administrative claimant
who received interim compensation should give it back, to the extent
necessary to make the secured creditors whole. This follows from the
secured creditors' remedy for failed adequate protection-a superpriority
that outranks even the trustee's priority.' It is a prime feature of junior
priority that any payment received before the seniors are paid is only
provisional.'0 2 Many courts have held that interim compensation is sub-
ject to return if some senior creditor appears on the scene later. 03
Nevertheless, one case seems to say (and has been read to say) that if
the lawyers have been paid on an interim basis under section 331, and if
secured creditors later lose their collateral, these attorneys do not have to
give back their ill-gotten fees to make the secured creditors whole. In In
re Calister 1 4 a secured creditor with a superpriority claim under section
507(b) asked for a declaration that this claim outranked any interim
compensation awarded under section 331. Judge Mabey refused to give
any such assurance, stating that when security interests encumber all as-
sets of a bankrupt debtor, the attorneys could not otherwise be paid:
Section 331 encourages... volunteerism and, as an inducement
to work for the estate, is a vital provision of the [Bankruptcy
Code]. Requests for adequate protection in Chapter 11 are
ubiquitous; each raises the spectre of a superpriority. If the
interim compensation until the trustee could show that it would not lead to a preference of the
professional persons over the other administrative claimants. Id. at 139.
98. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(A) (1988) (governing cash collateral). In noncash cases,
secured creditor consent is always grounds to invade collateral to cover ordinary administra-
tive expenses. See infra text accompanying notes 163-73.
99. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e).
100. Id. § 361(2).
101. Id. § 507(b).
102. David Gray Carlson, A Theory of Contractual Debt Subordination and Lien Priority,
38 VAND. L. REv. 975, 993-96 (1985).
103. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
104. 15 B.R. 521 (Bankr. D. Utah), appeal dismissed, 673 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1982), aff'd
sub nom. Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Callister, 13 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 21 (10th Cir.
1984).
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superpriority, in turn, might preempt interim fees, it would
jeopardize the further provision of services. The administrators
might mutiny.... They might cut comers .... They might
demand exorbitant retainers at the beginning of each case: but
for most debtors this either would be impossible or would de-
crease their chances for rehabilitation.105
This concern for paying the lawyers gave rise to an extraordinary rule of
law:
Section 507(b) gives the superpriority precedence over claims
allowed under 507(a), or in other words, over claims allowed
under 503(b). Fees, however, may be allowed under 330 and
331. When allowed under these provisions, instead of
503(b)(2), they are not subject to the regimen of 507. Moreover
... fees are not only allowed but also payable under 331. Sec-
tion 507(b), in contrast, is silent respecting payment. This gives
a de facto preeminence to fees.106
In other words, attorneys who receive interim compensation under sec-
tion 331 do not have to give it back if, later, the trustee incurs section
507(b) liabilities by dissipating the collateral. Payment is deemed final
and irreversible. This is so even though the secured creditors' claim for
compensation under section 507(b) expressly outranks the lawyers' ad-
ministrative priority under section 507(a)(1).
The scope of this ruling is clouded by the posture in which it was
made. In Callister, a large bankrupt estate clearly existed, so that it was
reasonable to expect that both the secured creditor's 507(b) claim and the
attorneys' administrative claims could be paid.10 7 It is not certain that
Mabey would have allowed an invasion of collateral without the aid of
section 506(c) if no unencumbered assets existed to pay the secured credi-
tors. 10 8 In addition, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
105. Id. at 535 (citations omitted). That large retainers up front are possible under the
Bankruptcy Code is a highly dubious assumption. Any retainer paid prior to bankruptcy is
property of the estate and must be returned. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a). Any retainer paid after the
petition is simply interim compensation under § 331, subject to whatever priorities attend
there. In re NBI, Inc., 129 B.R. 212, 224-26 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) (Cordova, J.).
Surprisingly, bankruptcy courts anxious to see attorneys paid in overencumbered cases
have allowed large prepetition retainers to displace § 331. These cases are criticized in Lester
Brickman & Jonathan Klein, Use ofAdvance Fee Attorney Retainer Agreements in Bankruptcy:
Another Special Law for Lawyers?, 43 S.C. L. REv. (forthcoming summer 1992).
106. Callister, 15 B.R. at 534-35 n.38a (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 524-25. The secured creditor's superpriority amounted to $29,868. Id. at 534.
The facts state that there was $332,122 in unencumbered assets on hand. Id. at 523 n.7 (sched-
ules listed $657,127 in secured claims and $980,249 in total assets).
108. Judge Mabey states that interim compensation is not absolutely required in the face of
inadequate collateral for the secured creditors:
Section 331 says that fees "may" be paid on an interim basis. There is a presump-
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cuit dismissed the appeal from Judge Mabey's decision, it noted that
interim allowances can always be called back, and for that reason the
secured creditor could not appeal from the interim award as a jurisdic-
tional matter.10 9 This implies that it was open for Judge Mabey to
change his mind and force the attorneys to give back their fees if the
unencumbered assets of the estate ran out.
Most subsequent authorities have scorned Judge Mabey's dictum
against attorney give-backs and instead have ruled that interim compen-
sation may be permitted only if it appears the estate will be large enough
to protect the secured creditors and cover the attorneys' fees;110 but if
that estimate should be wrong, the attorneys and other parties receiving
interim compensation will have to return their money to the estate so
that senior priorities can be honored."1 '
Other cases have simply proclaimed Callister in error. In General
Electric Credit Corp. v. Levin & Weintraub (In re Flagstaff Foodservice
Corp.)," 2 for instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed an oral opinion by District Judge Broderick, who had used sec-
tions 330 and 331 to justify paying interim fees to the lawyers at a time
tion, for the reasons outlined above, that they will be paid notwithstanding the exist-
ence of a superpriority.... But it is rebuttable under appropriate circumstances.
These circumstances, however, are not present in this case.
Id. at 535 (citations omitted). This language could be read to mean that interim compensation
is appropriate only if the bankrupt estate is large enough to pay both the secured creditors and
the attorneys and other § 331 claimants.
109. Callister v. Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. (In re Callister), 673 F.2d 305, 307 (10th Cir.
1982) (per curiain), aff'd, 13 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 21 (10th Cir. 1984).
110. See, eg., In re Ridgemont Apartment Assocs., 95 B.R. 247, 249-50 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1989) (Drake, J.); In re IML Freight, Inc., 52 B.R. 124, 139 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (Clark, J.)
(no interim compensation if attorneys would thereby receive more than other administrative
claimants); In re American Resources Mgmt. Corp., 51 B.R. 713, 719 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985).
One case that does so is In re Energy Cooperative, Inc., 55 B.R. 957 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985)
(Hertz, J.), but a close reading of that case does not reveal how unencumbered assets existed to
justify interim compensation. The secured creditors claimed $294 million but the firm had
only $271 million in assets. Id. at 960. The secured creditors also complained that there were
no unencumbered assets left in the estate with which to pay the lawyers. Id. at 961. Without
explanation, Judge Hertz proclaimed that $29 million was available to pay the attorneys. See
id. at 968. The court did not rule on whether this sum was encumbered, as the secured credi-
tors claimed.
11. In re Precast Structures, Inc., 122 B.R. 304, 306 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990) (Clark, J.)
("Such an interim award is subject to adjustment at the time of Application for Final Approval
of Fees, if it is later determined that the fees were incorrectly awarded"); Energy Coop., 55
B.R. at 967 ("[A]n inaccurate determination will not ultimately harm any claimholder in light
of the fact that fees improvidently granted will be returned to the estate for disbursement to
such a claimholder."); In re American Int'l Airways, Inc., 47 B.R. 716, 722 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1985) (King, J.).
112. 739 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1984) (Van Graafeiland, J.).
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when no unencumbered assets remained in the bankrupt estate.11 The
appeals court rejected this interpretation of interim compensation and
stated that, if secured creditors are to pay for the trustee's lawyers, such
awards must be justified under section 506(c).' 14
Only one case endorses Callister in its most raffish form. Judge Leti-
tia Clark has read Callister as a case that "allowed payment of interim
fees even where there are no unencumbered assets available in the es-
tate,"' 15 a statement that captures the dicta but not the facts of the case.
But Judge Clark went on to emphasize that the secured creditor before
her had sufficient other assets for adequate protection of its security in-
terest, so that the use of cash collateral was appropriate for ordinary ex-
penses of the estate.' 6 Hence, like Judge Mabey's in Callister, Judge
Clark's statement is mere dictum.
When all is said and done, however, something powerful can be said
in support of Callister's strong position in favor of interim compensation
without fear of give-backs. Attorneys and accountants are not the only
parties who receive interim distributions. Whenever a supplier dealing
with a debtor-in-possession or trustee asks for cash up front in exchange
for goods or services, the supplier receives an interim distribution just as
surely as a lawyer or an accountant. True, attorneys are paid under
Bankruptcy Code section 331, while suppliers probably obtain their cash
under section 363(c)(1)." 7 Either way, cash is being distributed before a
113. Appellants' Joint Appendix at A8, A9, General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Levin & Wein-
traub (In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.), 739 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1984) (No. 83-5044) (transcript
of oral opinion by District Court Judge Broderick.).
114. General Elea, 739 F.2d at 76-77; see also In re Chips 'n Twigs, Inc., 58 B.R. 109, 111
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (Goldhaber, J.) ("[I]nterim compensation cannot be paid from prop-
erty of the estate to the extent that the property is encumbered by a creditor's security inter-
est."); In re Colter, Inc., 53 B.R. 958, 960 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985) (McGrath, J.) (attorneys'
fees "are inferior and must be recaptured" to satisfy the secured creditors). It is not clear that
the Second Circuit would prohibit an award under § 331 when it appears likely that the estate
will be large enough to make secured creditors whole and pay all administrative claimants.
One bankruptcy judge has assumed that such a prohibition was intended. Energy Coop., 55
B.R. at 967.
115. In re Precast Structures, Inc., 122 B.R. 304, 305 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990).
116. Id. Readers should distinguish between (1) using cash collateral for the trustee's at-
torneys when adequate protection exists; (2) using cash collateral when adequate protection
does not exist and the attorneys cannot bring their services under § 506(c); and (3) using unen-
cumbered assets of the estate when the secured creditor has been denied adequate protection
for some unrelated reason and is now looking to the unencumbered assets to cover its § 507(b)
superpriority. The latter two propositions should be considered contrary to the Bankruptcy
Code. The first, however, is totally legitimate. See infra notes 174-200 and accompanying
text.
117. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (1988). This section provides:
If the business of the debtor is authorized to be operated ... and unless the court
orders otherwise, the trustee may enter into transactions, including the sale or lease
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plan is confirmed, or before liquidation dividends are issued. The
507(a)(1) priority encompasses both attorney distributions' 18 and ordi-
nary-course distributions.1 19 If, between the time the supplier receives
cash 20 and the end of the proceeding, all unencumbered assets have dis-
appeared, so that there is a shortfall with respect to the claims of other
administrative creditors or a secured creditor's superpriority claim under
section 507(b), then, under the anti-Callister line of reasoning, all suppli-
ers would be subject to give-backs if a secured creditor has a claim under
section 507(b) for failed adequate protection.1 2  Nothing in section
363(c)(1) repeals the priorities in section 507(b); 122 this fault is also the
reason section 331 (pertaining only to the trustee and her professionals)
does not overrule the priorities in section 507(b). In other words, the
argument that attacks Callister turns back upon ordinary-course transac-
tions and holds them subject to recall, if necessary to vindicate the Bank-
ruptcy Code's priority system.
That ordinary-course transactions by a trustee are subject to call-
back is unthinkable. Undoubtedly the heavy weight of pragmatic neces-
sity will dictate that attorneys have to give back their fees, but other
suppliers of ordinary-course goods and services do not have to give back
cash demanded and received. Yet if the logic of the anti-Calfister cases
requires the call-back of all parties encompassed by the administrative
of property of the estate, in the ordinary course of business, without notice or a
hearing, and may use property of the estate in the ordinary course of business with-
out notice or a hearing.
Id.
118. Section 331 refers to the standards of § 330, which governs noninterim payment to
professionals. See id. § 330. Section 503(b)(2) allows reimbursement for compensation under
§ 330(a). See id. § 503(b)(2). And § 507(a)(1) gives priority to any claim under § 503(b). See
id. § 507(a)(1). Therefore, any attorney who works on credit-or who works for cash but is
made to give back her fee-has a priority under § 507(a)(1). See In re Tri-County Water
Ass'n, 91 B.R. 547, 549 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1988) (Hoyt, J.).
119. Section 503(b) "includes" ordinary course matters like salaries and services. 11
U.S.C. § 503(b). Therefore, credit obtained in the ordinary-course of business (but not paid)
most likely would be entitled to an administrative priority. See id. § 364(a) (trustee may ob-
tain ordinary course credit "allowable under section 503(b)(1)"). Section 507(a)(1) invokes
section 503(b). Consequently, ordinary-course credit (and claims arising from any forced give-
backs of cash) is entitled to administrative priority, just as attorney claims are.
120. Cash, in this context, means unencumbered cash. If the cash is cash collateral, and if
the Bankruptcy Code has been followed, then the secured creditor who previously owned the
cash has either consented to its use and waived its lien, or it has received replacement collateral
by way of adequate protection. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c).
121. See id. § 726(b) ("Payment on claims of a kind specified in paragraph (1) . . . of
section 507(a) of this title ... shall be made pro rata among claims of the kind specified in
[that] particular paragraph . . ").
122. But see id. § 364(c)(1) (providing that trustee may obtain credit by promising prospec-
tive lenders a priority higher than that provided by § 507(b)).
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priority described in section 503(b),12 3 then Callister seems much better
law than is usually conceded.
The only argument I can think of to distinguish professionals from
ordinary-course suppliers is that the title (though not the text) 2 4 of sec-
tion 331 refers to "interim" compensation, whereas no such word ap-
pears in section 363(c)(1). "Interim" connotes temporary or
provisional.'25 Perhaps the use of this word in the title of section 330
serves to repeal the notion of "final payment" for lawyers and other pro-
fessionals, though not for ordinary-course suppliers. But this argument
is not the strongest peg on which to hang the hat of practical necessity,
no matter how feather-light such a hat may be. It is still true that ordi-
nary-course transactions are interim payments of an administrative pri-
ority. Secured creditors who have lost their adequate protection are
supposed to outrank administrative claimants, and it is a fundamental
notion of subordination that wrongful payments be returned so that pri-
123. By the same logic, if remaining unencumbered assets are less than adequate to pay
administrative creditors, then the trustee may not buy anything for 100 cents on the dollar,
because the supplier would have merely an equal priority to the unpaid administrative claim-
ants. The only exception would be that, when Chapter 11 converts to Chapter 7, the Chapter 7
"burial expenses" do outrank the administrative claims dating back to the Chapter 11 case.
Id. § 726(b).
Also, in dealing with attorneys' fees, courts have refused to distinguish between attorneys'
fees paid in advance of bankruptcy (retainers) and interim compensation sought after the work
is done. See In re Tri-County Water Ass'n, 91 B.R. 547, 550-51 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1988) (Hoyt,
J.). If this rule applies to attorneys, it ought to apply equally to suppliers who pay cash.
124. Section 331 is captioned: "Interim compensation." See 11 U.S.C. § 331 (1988). The
Uniform Commercial Code expressly makes section captions part of the law. U.C.C. § 1-109
(1978). Under federal law, section titles do not have this status. According to Justice Murphy,
headings and titles are not meant to take the place of the detailed provisions of the
text. Nor are they necessarily designed to be a reference guide or a synopsis. Where
the text is complicated and prolific, headings and titles can do no more than indicate
the provisions in a most general manner; to attempt to refer to each specific provi-
sions would often be ungainly as well as useless. As a result, matters in the text
which deviate from those falling within the general pattern are frequently unrefiected
in the headings and titles. Factors of this type have led to the wise rule that the title
of a statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.
For interpretative purposes, they are of use only when they shed light on some am-
biguous word or phrase. They are but tools available for the resolution of a doubt.
But they cannot undo or limit that which the text makes plain.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947) (citations
omitted); see also Scarborough v. Office of Personnel Management, 723 F.2d 801, 811 (11th
Cir. 1984) (Clark, J.) ("[R]eliance upon headings to determine the meaning of a statute is not a
favored method of statutory construction."); Public Serv. Co. v. New Hampshire (In re Pub.
Serv. Co.), 108 B.R. 854, 884 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989) (Yacos, J.) (Case law "suggests that titles
cannot contradict the meaning of clear text."). But see Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714,
723 (1989) (giving weight to statute heading when text was ambiguous).
125. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN
LANGUAGE 1179 (1976) (defining "interim" as "temporary; provisional").
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orities might be vindicated.126 Accordingly, it must be said that the dis-
tinction between paying lawyers and paying other ordinary-course
suppliers is based more on intuitive truths than on Code-based principles.
To summarize, this part of the Article has discussed a theory under
which secured creditors could be made to pay the expenses of bankruptcy
administration, even though the expenses did not benefit the secured
creditor within the meaning of section 506(c). The theory holds that in-
terim payments to professionals are final. Thus, if adequate protection of
security interests fail, the remedial superpriority under section 507(b),
which is supposed to outrank the administrative priority of section
507(a)(1), cannot have its effect because the lawyers have already tapped
the estate dry through interim compensation. Through this indirect
method, the secured creditors can be made to pay the ordinary expenses
of bankruptcy administration.
The next section discusses a slightly different technique for achiev-
ing the same end: postpetition loan agreements in which property of the
estate is pledged to lenders in exchange for which the lender promises to
pay the ordinary expenses of bankruptcy directly to the supplier, without
any loan proceeds passing through the bankrupt estate.
3. Carve-Out Orders
When a secured creditor has soaked up all the assets of a debtor, a
bankruptcy judge needs to find a way to pay the lawyers if the bank-
ruptcy proceeding is to continue. We shall soon see the extent to which
section 506(c) might be used to pay the attorneys. 127 But suppose a
bankruptcy judge finds herself in a circuit that takes a narrow view of
section 506(c)'s scope. For instance, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has taken a very narrow view of section 506(c),
holding that attorney services to the debtor-in-possession do not benefit
secured creditors when a bankrupt estate with unencumbered assets de-
volves into an estate with all assets encumbered.1 28 The same case also
expressly disapproves of Calister1 29 Does this twin ruling mean that the
126. Complicating matters is the fact that no one can be a holder in due course of checks-
or, under analogous common law, cash-issued in a judicial proceeding. U.C.C. § 3-302(3)(a)
(1978) (holder is not a holder in due course "by purchase of [a negotiable instrument] at judi-
cial sale"); see also id. § 3-302 cmt. 3 ("The provision applies to a... sale in bankruptcy ....
"). Hence, it is hard for a supplier to claim that it takes checks or even cash free and clear of
the obligation to return it if needed to cover the claims of senior creditors.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 244-309.
128. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Levin & Weintraub (In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.),
739 F.2d 73, 75-77 (2d Cir. 1984) (Van Graafeiland, J.). For a discussion of the facts of this
case, see infra notes 244-53 and accompanying text.
129. General Elec., 739 F.2d at 75.
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assets of the firm must be abandoned to the secured creditor for foreclo-
sure under state law?
In In re Connecticut Printers, Inc. 3' Judge Krechevsky thought he
found a way to protect the trustee's lawyers from secured creditors. He
achieved this goal by means of section 364(c), which governs postpetition
credit. Section 364(c) states:
If the trustee is unable to obtain unsecured credit ... as an
administrative expense, the court, after notice and a hearing,
may authorize the obtaining of credit or the incurring of debt-
(1) with priority over any or all administrative expenses of
the kind specified in section 503(b) or 507(b) of this title;
(2) secured by a lien on property of the estate that is not
otherwise subject to a lien; or
(3) secured by a junior lien on property of the estate that is
subject to a lien. 131
Under this provision, the bankruptcy trustee in Connecticut Printers
pledged all the debtor's unencumbered assets to a financing bank in ex-
change for the bank's promise to pay the trustee and her attorneys. The
theory seemed to be that if unencumbered assets were laundered through
a financing bank, those assets could no longer be reached by secured
creditors with a higher priority than the trustee. If this scheme-called a
"carve-out"' 32
-works, a trustee can preserve her fee and dissipate col-:
lateral without fear of subordination to secured creditors deprived of
their adequate protection.1 33
There is one weakness in this scheme. If the financing bank takes a
lien on unencumbered assets of the estate, the dollars it advances are not
necessarily encumbered. Therefore, if the trustee and her attorney take
these loan proceeds, they take property of the estate and are in precisely
the same position as the lawyers in the anti-Callister cases discussed
above. 134 They must give back their fees if necessary to make secured
creditors whole, because secured creditors whose adequate protection has
failed have, under section 507(b), a higher priority than the trustee.135
130. No. 2-90-00771 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 1990) para. 12 (Stipulation and Agreed
Order Providing for Interim Use of Cash Collateral) (Chapter 11).
131. 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
132. Stephen A. Stripp, Balancing of Interests in Orders Authorizing the Use of Cash Collat-
eral in Chapter 11, 21 SETON HALL L. REv. 562, 579 (1991).
133. According to Judge Stripp, these carve-outs are also often supplemented with an order
that the debtor-in-possession or trustee may never charge § 506(c) expenses against the carve-
out lender. Id. at 578-79. Judge Stripp thinks that such orders ought to be illegal and ignored
later in the bankruptcy proceeding, if a judge accidentally signs such a waiver. See id.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
135. See In re Precast Structures, Inc., 122 B.R. 304, 305-06 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990)
19921
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Section 364(c)(1) explicitly provides that the financing bank's collateral is
immune from the claims of other secured creditors whose adequate pro-
tection has failed. But how can the loan proceeds be protected so the
trustee may obtain her fee in violation of the Bankruptcy Code?
Judge Krechevsky's solution was to deem the loan proceeds cash
collateral of the bank, unless drawn upon by the trustee and his profes-
sionals for their fees.' 3 6 Thus, if the trustee did not draw on this account,
the financing bank still owned the loan proceeds, which never entered the
bankrupt estate. Hence, they were shielded from a disappointed secured
creditor's superpriority under section 507(b). Meanwhile, the trustee
and his professionals, who could not have tapped the unencumbered as-
sets directly for their fees, were able to get paid free and clear of the
senior claims of secured creditors who were denied their adequate
protection.
The flaw in this scheme is its premise that when the bank pays the
trustee directly, the loan proceeds never enter the bankrupt estate. When
the trustee exercises her power to take money from the account, she must
do so pursuant to a fiduciary duty owed to the general creditors. Any
secured creditor deprived of adequate protection is a general creditor to
whom this duty is owed. Therefore, it should follow that money taken
by the trustee is for the use and benefit of the bankrupt estate and subject
to the priorities established by the Bankruptcy Code. These priorities in
turn dictate the rule of return established by the anti-Callister cases.
If Judge Krechevsky's order stands up on appeal to the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals (which hardly seems possible),' 37 the trustee will
(Clark, J.); In re Energy Coop., Inc., 55 B.R. 957, 967 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (Hertz, J.); In re
American Int'l Airways, Inc., 47 B.R. 716, 722 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (King, J.); see supra
text accompanying notes 117-22.
136. In re Connecticut Printers, Inc., No. 2-90.00771 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 1990) para.
12 (Stipulation and Agreed Order Providing for Interim Use of Cash Collateral). According
to this Order:
Bank shall establish an account in its name entitled "Connecticut Printers Chapter
11 Account" (the "Chapter 11 Account") into which it will deposit the first $200,000
of Cash Collateral paid over to it ... to the extent such Cash Collateral represents
proceeds of Accounts arising from the shipment by Debtor of goods after the Petition
Date. The money held in the Chapter 11 account shall be subject to the lien and
security interests granted to the Bank pursuant to [earlier orders] but Bank shall
release from the Chapter 11 Account any amounts awarded to the Trustee, the pro-
fessional people employed by him and the fees of the United States Trustee as above
provided.
Id.
137. The governing precedent, General Electric Credit Corp. v. Levin & Weintraub (In re
Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.), 739 F.2d 73, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1984), does not deal with postpeti-
tion credit carve-out orders, but it does reveal tremendous hostility to the idea that secured
creditors can be made to beat the expenses of ordinary bankruptcy administration. Since
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have developed an ingenious way of paying her lawyers and herself when
assets are insufficient to reimburse the secured creditors.138 If that
scheme succeeds, then, even though section 506(c) does not allow the
trustee to charge his expenses to a secured creditor, and even though the
secured creditor might outrank the trustee's own claim for compensa-
tion, no unencumbered assets will remain in the estate against which the
secured creditor's superpriority might apply.
4. Summary
The last three subsections of this Article have discussed theories
whereby a trustee might charge expenses to the secured creditors without
any reliance on section 506(c) and its requirement that secured creditors
be "benefited" by such expenditures. The first of these ideas, disencum-
bering cash proceeds under section 552(b), does require, at least accord-
ing to the legislative history, that the expenditures be related to
generating the cash proceeds. This requirement probably means that sec-
tion 552(b) simply replicates the standards of section 506(c). The second
idea is that interim distributions to attorneys and other professionals are
"final payments" that cannot be recalled if the bankrupt estate exhausts
itself and if the secured creditors' adequate protection has failed. As we
have seen, the case law weighs heavily against a final payment rule with
regard to lawyers. Finally, carve-out orders might be a way to launder
estate property through a superpriority postpetition lender so that, if ade-
quate protection fails, payments to the lawyers and other professionals
(made directly by the lender to the professionals) are immunized against
the secured creditors' higher priority. This last idea is conceptually
flawed because any withdrawals by the professionals are withdrawals
pursuant to a fiduciary duty not to defeat the priorities of the Bankruptcy
Code. Hence, it is unlikely that any theory separate from section 506(c)
should work to impose the expenses of bankruptcy administration on se-
cured creditors.
Given that section 506(c) governs the conditions under which se-
Judge Krechevsky's subterfuge of the Bankruptcy Code is transparent, it is hard to believe that
such an order would survive appellate scrutiny.
138. Furthermore, the financing bank may be substantially immune from reversal on ap-
peal. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(e) (1988). The exact scope of this immunity is in bitter dispute.
Compare In re EDC Holding Co., 676 F.2d 945, 947-48 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (lender not
entitled to appeal-free security interest when violation of Bankruptcy Code is patent) with
Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co. (In re Saybrook Mfg. Co.), 127 B.R. 494, 496, 499-500 (M.D.
Ga. 1991) (Fitzpatrick, J.) (lender immune even though postpetition collateral given for prepe-
tition unsecured claims). The travesty of justice that § 364(e) represents is well treated in
Charles J. Tabb, Lender Preference Clauses and the Destruction of Appealability and Finality:
Resolving a Chapter 11 Dilemma, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 109, 116-35 (1989).
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cured creditors can be made to bear the expenses of the bankruptcy
trustee, the next section of this Article shows how a bankruptcy court's
valuation of a secured creditor's collateral affects the extent to which a
trustee may use section 506(c) to charge a secured creditor with adminis-
trative expense.
II. COLLATERAL VALUE AND 506(c) EXPENSES
A. The Definition of Value
Fundamental to the Bankruptcy Code is the need to place an as-
sessed valuation on collateral in the possession of the bankruptcy
trustee. 139 According to section 506(a):
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on prop-
erty in which the estate has an interest.., is a secured claim to
the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's
interest in such property ... and is an unsecured claim to the
extent that the value of such creditor's interest ... is less than
the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be deter-
mined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the pro-
posed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction
with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affect-
ing such creditor's interest."*
The meaning of section 506(a) for undersecured creditors-and section
506(c) is relevant only for undersecured creditors"4'-is that their claims
are subdivided into their wholly secured and wholly unsecured parts.
That is, the undersecured creditor is made the owner of two unrelated
claims in bankruptcy-one secured and the other unsecured. To achieve
this subdivision, a bankruptcy judge must place a value on the collateral.
Yet, section 506(a) does not clearly state how this valuation should be
made. Indeed, the legislative history urges judges to make the rules for
valuation on a case-by-case basis. 42 Accordingly, there are a great
139. For a description of the legal significance of valuations in bankruptcy, see John B.
Butler, IL Valuation of Secured Claims Under 11 US.C. 506(a), 89 CoM. L.J. 342, 345
(1984); David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of Valuations in Bank-
ruptcy, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 63, 63-70 (1991); Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Valua-
tions in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1061,passim (1985); James F. Queenan, Jr., Standards
for Valuation of Security Interests in Chapter 11, 92 COM. L.J. 18, 25-28 (1987).
140. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 12-39.
142. "'Value' does not necessarily contemplate forced sale or liquidation value of the col-
lateral; nor does it always imply a full going-concern value. Courts will have to determine
value on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the facts of each case and the competing
interests in the case." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1977); see S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1978).
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many theories about what valuation entails. 43
One important aspect of valuation theory collides with the meaning
of section 506(c). This theoretical aspect stems from the fact that the
value of collateral to the buyer differs from its value to the seller by virtue
of the transaction costs required to realize a sale. To be sure, in the real
world, these costs-sales expense and maintenance pending sale-are ul-
timately borne jointly by the buyer and seller (at least where supply and
demand are both elastic). Either the seller covers them and charges the
buyer what the market will bear, or the buyer covers them, in which case
the buyer's demand for the item falls accordingly. 1" But these are hypo-
thetical transaction costs, which have not yet been, and may never be,
143. These theories are reviewed in Carlson, supra note 139, at 70-87.
144. This is not to say that the equilibrium price will be the same, no matter who bears the
transaction costs. Because of the shape of the supply and demand curves, transaction costs are
borne at different levels of efficiency. For example, suppose the supply curve faced by the
producer is defined as P = 5 + 1.1Q. The demand curve faced by the consumer is Q = 100
- 3P. In a competitive market, these curves produce an equilibrium price of
P = 5 + 1.1[100 - 3P]
P = 26.74
Total quantity produced is
Q = 100 - 3[5 + 1.1Q]
Q = 19.7674
Suppose a transaction cost of 10 is added and is borne by the seller. This changes the supply
curve to P = 15 + I.IQ. The demand curve is unchanged, but the supply is now more
expensive. Less of it is demanded. In such a case:
P = 15 + 1.1[100 - 3P] = 29.06
Q = 100 - 3[15 + 1.1Q] = 12.79
If the same transaction cost is borne by the consumer, then the original supply curve is re-
stored, but the entire demand curve shifts downward: Q = 90 - 3P
P = 5 + 1.1[90 -. 3P] = 24.18
Q = 90 - 3[5 + 1.10] = 17.44
On these numbers, total gain to society (the producer's economic rents plus consumer
surplus) was $938.9515 before transaction costs. If the producer bears transaction costs, the
total gain falls to $543.575. If the consumer bears transaction costs, the total gain increases to
$741.20. Hence, given the stipulated supply and demand curves, comparative efficiencies favor
the consumer bearing the transaction costs. (Total gain-economic rents plus consumer sur-
plus--can be calculated as follows:
Q[x - y]
2
where x is the conjunction of the ordinate and the supply curve (100 or 90) and y is the
conjunction of the demand curve and the ordinate (15 or 5). Since, on our numbers, (x - y)
- 85, the above formula can be reduced to 42.5Q.)
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incurred. Whether these hypothetical costs are deducted affects the size
of a secured claim in bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy judges should be aware of the relation between market
value and expected transaction costs, because it is too easy to modulate
between choosing a price that the buyer will pay (before transaction costs
are covered by the seller) or the price the seller will receive (after transac-
tion costs are covered). Thus, we are faced not only with a terminologi-
cal confusion, but also with a substantive property entitlement confusion
when presented with the notion of the "value" of collateral: should value
be ex post or ex ante transaction costs?
There is no simple answer to this question. Some courts have taken
the view that value should be ex post transaction costs because value
should represent what the secured creditor takes out of a hypothetical
foreclosure sale.145 This rule comports with a common sort of imaginary
exercise: the secured creditor is entitled to whatever she would have re-
ceived if there were no bankruptcy at all. 146 But under such a rule, col-
lateral will always have an equity cushion at the time of valuation since
the hypothetical buyer will always pay in more than the secured creditor
hypothetically takes out. For example, suppose a bankruptcy court
thinks that, if there were no bankruptcy, a buyer at a foreclosure sale
would pay $100 for collateral, but the seller would bear transaction costs
of $5. Meanwhile, the secured creditor claims $300. Although the col-
lateral is substantially overencumbered, the bankrupt estate has a posi-
tive equity in this collateral. The secured claim would be set at $95 and
debtor equity would be worth $5.147
If collateral always has extra value beyond the amount of the se-
cured claim-the difference between what a buyer would pay in and
what the secured creditor would take out-one part of the Bankruptcy
Code is threatened with superfluity. According to section 362(d)(2)(a), a
secured creditor is entitled to have bankruptcy's automatic stay lifted if
the debtor has no equity in the collateral.' 48 If the definition of value is
such that debtor equity always exists, then section 362(d)(2)(a) is wrong-
fully deprived of its necessity.
It is a prime rule of statutory construction that no statutory lan-
145. See, e.g., In re Boring, 91 B.R. 791, 795 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (Coles, J.) (citing
and dismissing contrary authority).
146. See Carlson, supra note 139, at 70-75.
147. The secured creditor also would have a separate unsecured deficit claim of $205. See
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
148. Id. § 362(d)(2)(A). In addition, the property must not be necessary for an effective
reorganization. Id. § 362(d)(2)(B). If either premise is true, the secured creditor may not
obtain relief from the automatic stay.
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guage in the Bankruptcy Code should be rendered useless. Thus, in
United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates,149 Justice
Scalia denied postpetition interest to undersecured creditors as part of
their right to adequate protection because, otherwise, section 362(d)(2)
would have been rendered superfluous. Arguing from superfluity is al-
ways a dangerous strategy-it can be defeated merely by thinking up
some use for the statute. In Timbers, if secured parties are paid opportu-
nity costs as part of adequate protection, a secured creditor still has the
incentive to use section 362(d)(2) whenever it believes the court's valua-
tion is too low or if the interest compensation is inadequate.150 Never-
theless, Timbers undoubtedly stands for the efficacy of such arguments in
general. Thus, a definition of value that always guarantees a debtor eq-
uity might be impermissible because it reads section 362(d)(2)(a) out of
the Bankruptcy Code.151
To resolve the dilemma posed by deducting hypothetical transaction
costs from the value of collateral, Judge Smallenberger was forced in In
re Skains1 12 to rule that the secured creditor was entitled to have the
automatic stay lifted even if debtor equity exists. Said Judge Smal-
lenberger: "The law has never meant that there must be absolutely no
equity in property, because the secured creditor needs some cushion in
order to pay the costs of foreclosure in state court." ' 3 Hence, Judge
Smallenberger saved the definition of value ex post transaction costs, but
only at the expense of re-writing section 362(d)(2)(A) to mean that the
stay can be lifted even if debtor equity exists.
B. Valuation Ex Post Transaction Costs and Section 506(c)
Suppose that a secured creditor's collateral is valued as the amount
the secured creditor will realize after hypothetical transaction costs are
deducted. What happens if the trustee really does incur transaction costs
that exceed these estimates?
If the trustee spent precisely what the secured creditor would have
149. 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
150. Carlson, supra note 1, at 608-09.
151. In re Felten, 95 B.R. 629 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988) (Melloy, J.). In Felten, the debtor
argued that the secured creditor's collateral should be valued according to what a secured
creditor would get (after transaction costs) at a foreclosure sale. The court rejected this stan-
dard and instead chose the "fair market value," which is "'the price which a willing seller
under no compulsion to sell and a willing buyer under no compulsion to buy would agree
upon."' Id. at 630 (quoting In re Courtright, 57 B.R. 495, 496 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986)). By this,
the court seemed to mean a standard based on what a buyer pays in, not on what a seller clears
after transaction costs.
152. 46 B.R. 500 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1984).
153. Id. at 502.
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spent, no problem arises. Suppose, for example, that a court estimates a
buyer would pay $100 for collateral, but transaction costs are $5. The
secured creditor's maximum secured claim under section 506(a) is there-
fore $95. Suppose further that, in a subsequent sale free and clear of
liens,' 54 the trustee obtains a bid of $100 and does spend $5 marketing
the collateral. On these numbers, the secured creditor gets $95 in cash
proceeds, and the trustee may take the sales expense from the debtor
equity in the collateral, without the need to invade the secured claim
under section 506(c). In such a scenario, no conflicts of interest arise.
Theory and practice are happily in unison.
Suppose, instead, that the costs incurred by the trustee exceed the
hypothetical transaction costs of the secured creditor. Say she had to
spend $12 to liquidate collateral. Without question, the trustee can
charge $5 of this expense against the debtor's equity of $5. For this
charge, section 506(c) is not even needed. But can the trustee also invade
the secured creditor's principal under section 506(c) and reduce the se-
cured creditor's take by another $7? Under these circumstances, secured
creditors are apt to argue that they were not "benefited" by the trustee's
overpriced services, within the meaning of section 506(c).
The answer to this question should depend on the reason the hypo-
thetical and actual expenditures did not match. What follows are some
reasons for the disharmony and their effects on the trustee's entitlement
under section 506(c).
1. Error in the Valuation
One possible reason the trustee might spend more than the original
valuation is that the estimate was erroneous. That is, the court or the
parties should have foreseen that transaction costs would have been
higher than the initial estimate. Should the trustee be able to invade
principal under such circumstances?
The answer to this question depends on whether it is generally per-
missible for courts to adjust 506(a) valuations to account for earlier er-
rors in estimation. Opinion is divided on this question. The weight of
authority seems to favor the ability of a court to adjust its valuations
from time to time,155 and so an adjustment based on misestimated trans-
154. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(0(3) (1988).
155. See David Gray Carlson, Undersecured Claims Under Bankruptcy Code Sections
506(a) and 1111(b): Second Looks at Judicial Valuations of Collateral, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 253,
258-60 (1989). According to the Congressional Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States:
The procedures required by the Act in the sale of property of a bankrupt estate have
been much criticized for the inordinate administrative detail and expense. The
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action costs ought to be possible. Hence, when the trustee spends more
than the hypothetical transaction costs that, on hindsight, seem to have
been naively underestimated, either the estimate should be readjusted, so
that the trustee can reimburse herself from the now-larger debtor eq-
uity-without the aid of section 506(c)-or the trustee should be able to
recover from the collateral under section 506(c). Under either theory,
the secured creditor must bear the expense actually incurred by the
trustee.
2. Overexpenditure by the Trustee
A second reason the trustee may have exceeded the expected trans-
action costs is that the trustee spent more than was necessary. Section
506(c) provides that the trustee can charge secured creditors with only
"reasonable" and "necessary" expenses of sale and collateral preserva-
tion. 5 6 Therefore, a finding that part of the trustee's expenses are "not
necessary" would be fatal to the trustee's claim for expenses. Neverthe-
less, if the trustee has not been reckless or profligate, an argument exists
for allowing the trustee to invade the secured creditor's principal, on the
theory that the trustee's business judgment ought to be protected.157
3. Comparative Efficiencies
A third and very potent reason for the cost overrun-and one that
contradicts what has just been said-is institutional in nature: secured
creditors (at least under the Uniform Commercial Code) often have ac-
cess to cheap self-help remedies, while a bankruptcy trustee is burdened
with many expensive legal formalities. As a result, a bankruptcy trustee
is institutionally more likely to spend more to sell collateral than many
secured creditors would. But this conclusion is subject to an inherent
indeterminacy. Recall that the standard of value is based on imagining
what a secured creditor would have realized at state law. On the one
hand, this expense could be imagined to be very low, as in the case of a
peaceable self-help repossession. On the other hand, if the debtor would
have threatened violence, self-help would be impossible; the secured
trustee must ordinarily obtain court approval in the form of an order permitting the
sale; creditors must ordinarily be notified of any proposed sale; the property must
ordinarily be appraised; the sale must ordinarily be a public sale, and the trustee's
sale is subject to approval or disapproval by the court. Not only are such procedures
not conducive to getting the best price, but the expenses frequently consume a sub-
stantial part of the proceeds obtained from the sale.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1973).
156. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1988).
157. In re AFCO Enters., Inc., 35 B.R. 512, 517-18 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983) (Clark, J.).
1992]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70
creditor would resort to a replevin action at state law, considerably rais-
ing the cost of collecting. 5 None of this is verifiable, since it is all based
on the imagination of the judge. Translated into bankruptcy terms, the
bankrupt estate is impoverished if the bankruptcy judge fancies the
debtor to be polite and deferential to the rights of the secured creditor,
and is enriched if the judge views the debtor as a brawling, cheating thug.
Let us suppose that a bankruptcy court decides that, but for the
bankruptcy, the secured creditor would have repossessed very cheaply
under the self-help provisions of Article 9. Accordingly, if the trustee
sells the collateral and incurs 506(c) expenses, she is sure to exceed
whatever was hypothesized as part of the definition of value. That is, by
force of the definitions, a trustee must exceed the estimated transaction
costs of selling the collateral.
Some old cases prohibit invasion of the secured claim by the trustee,
under these circumstances.1 59 Some modem cases echo this view. 16 0
158. The expense that would have been incurred if there had been no bankruptcy is not a
verifiable proposition. It depends entirely on the rules by which hypothetical, nonexistent uni-
verses are constructed. See Carlson, supra note 139, at 70-75.
159. See Textile Banking Co. v. Widener, 265 F.2d 446, 454 (4th Cir. 1959) (Paul, J.) ("the
fund may be charged with the actual costs of the sale by the trustee or the cost of enforcing the
lien in a State court, whichever is the smaller sum"); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Rhodes, 214
F.2d 606, 607 (5th Cir. 1954) (Holmes, J.); L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Walker, 119 F.2d 535, 536 (5th
Cir.) (Foster, J.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 647 (1941); see Frank R. Kennedy, An Adversary Pro-
ceeding Under the New Bankruptcy Rules, With Special Reference to a Sale Free of Liens, 79
COM. L.J. 425, 438-40 (1974). These cases all dealt with trustee sales in which the trustee
spent more than expected. To be distinguished are cases in which the trustee attempts to
charge preservation expenses to the secured creditor under § 506(c). These preservation cases
are discussed infra notes 244-309 and accompanying text.
160. Thus, in In re Wyckoff, 52 B.R. 164 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1985) (Nims, J.), a trustee
sought to recover storage fees under § 506(c), but was denied. Judge Nims remarked,
If not for the bankruptcy, [the secured creditor] could have disposed of its collateral
much sooner and at a total cost that would have enabled it to realize the amount of
its claim in full. Such costs may have included a small storage fee as well as costs of
sale, but clearly it would not have found it necessary to store the inventory for four
months at a cost exceeding $1,200.00 per month.
Id. at 168; see also C.I.T. Corp. v. A & A Printing, Inc., 70 B.R. 878, 881 (M.D.N.C. 1987)
(Bullock, J.) (holding that rental and security expenses could not be charged to the secured
creditors); In re Richards Pontiac, Inc., 24 B.R. 758, 760-61 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (Hall, J.)
(stating that the lienholders would be permitted to demonstrate that they could have recovered
their collateral from the debtor more cheaply without the trustee having interceded); First
Nat'l Bank v. Taylor (In re Modem Mix, Inc.), 18 B.R. 746, 749 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1982)
(Caffey, J.) (stating that since the secured creditor could have collected the debtor's accounts
receivable without expense, the secured creditor was not liable to the trustee for the trustee's
expenses incurred in collecting such receivables); Moister v. Farmers Bank (In re Truitt), 15
B.R. 169, 171 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (Robinson, J.) (declaring that charges to the general
creditors are permissible only to the extent that the service was necessary and benefited the
creditors). The Taylor case seems particularly confused. In Taylor the trustee collected en-
cumbered accounts receivable and wanted to charge the secured creditor for the expense.
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These cases have emphasized the requirement in section 506(c) that the
expenditure "benefit" the secured creditor. 6 ' That is, since a secured
creditor could have foreclosed cheaply under state law, an expensive
bankruptcy foreclosure is, by definition, not for the benefit of the secured
creditor. According to this view, the trustee is never allowed to invade
the secured claim to recover even reasonable expenses of sale. Instead,
the trustee, who should have abandoned the collateral to the secured
creditor for enforcement under state law, must bear the costs of disposing
of the collateral.
We saw earlier that, if valuation is ex post transaction costs, then all
collateral has debtor equity built in.'62 Under such a definition of value,
limiting section 506(c) expenses to what the secured creditor would have
spent had there had been no bankruptcy translates into a rule that en-
forcement expenses may only be recovered out of debtor equity and never
out of the collateral needed to support the secured claim of an under-
secured creditor. Such a rule essentially reads section 506(c) out of the
Bankruptcy Code, because the trustee does not need section 506(c) in
order to use the debtor's equity. On the premise that no part of the
Bankruptcy Code should be rendered superfluous, the continued vitality
of section 506(c) demands the rejection of such cases. Instead, "benefit,"
within the meaning of section 506(c), should comprehend circumstances
when the trustee spent more than the secured creditor would have, if no
bankruptcy proceeding existed.
4. Consent
One common rationale for invading the secured claim is that the
secured creditor has consented to it. Of course, consent must come from
Mysteriously, the court denied recovery because the secured creditor supposedly could have
collected for no expense at all. Taylor, 18 B.R. at 749. Thus, the case may be an application of
the rule that the trustee may never recover when her efforts exceed in cost what the secured
creditor would have incurred.
161. See, eg., Dozoryst v. First Fin. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 21 B.R. 392, 394 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(Shadur, J.) (trustee must show quantitative benefit, presumably in comparison to what the
secured creditor could have realized on its own); In re Birdsboro Casting Corp., 69 B.R. 955,
959 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (Fox, J.) ("[D]ebtor's counsel had the burden of showing that the
Bank received a benefit from his services-that is, the Bank recovered more than it would have
but for those services, or that counsel somehow eliminated expenses that the creditor would
otherwise have had to bear.").
162. See supra text accompanying note 148. One commentator overlooks this and there-
fore erroneously thinks that secured parties get a windfall where § 506(c) charges are disal-
lowed. See Savage, supra note 13, at 434 ("considerations of fairness would seemingly require
that a secured creditor contribute at least what he has been spared by foreclosure in bank-
ruptcy"). This comment pertains only if a certain theory of valuation is presupposed-one in
which value is estimated without deducting hypothetical transactions costs.
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the secured creditor whose claim is being invaded. The consent of a se-
nior secured creditor who faces no invasion because she enjoys an equity
cushion is irrelevant to bind the junior secured creditor who will really
foot the bill.' 63
In re Orbitronics, Inc.,1 'is a case in which the court allowed the
invasion of the secured claim on a theory of consent.16 5 Here the secured
creditor wrote a letter authorizing the payment of trustee compensa-
tion-not ordinarily chargeable to the secured creditor under section
506(c)16 6-- from the proceeds of collateral.167 This was real consent, not
low-grade acquiescence or apathy. The former surely must be as rare as
the latter is common.
Not surprisingly, trustees are constantly trying to make acquies-
cence into affirmative consent. With some exceptions, 168 courts usually
do not take the bait.169 Some courts have pointed out quite rightly that
consent to retention of collateral by a trustee in general is not the same as
consent to any expense the trustee wants to incur. 7 Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, secured parties are entitled to adequate protection of the
security interests, which means protection against invasion of the collat-
eral by the trustee. Hence, consent to foreclosure may mean consent to
the sale itself given adequate protection, a version of consent that would
163. In re Trenge, 127 B.R. 552, 554-55 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (Pollack, J.). Of course, the senior
secured creditor could agree to reduce her claim and hold the junior secured creditor harmless.
In such a case, consent is a good theory to apply to § 506(c) expenses, but only to the senior
secured creditor. Id. at 555 n.3.
164. 254 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Wis. 1966) (Reynolds, J.).
165. Id. at 404-05.
166. First Nat'l Bank v. B & L Enters., Inc. (In re B & L Enters., Inc.), 26 B.R. 220, 223
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (trustee's statutory fee under § 326(a) cannot be brought in under
§ 506(c)).
167. Orbitronics, 254 F. Supp. at 402-03.
168. See, eg., In re Pioneer Sample Book Co., 374 F.2d 953, 961 (3d Cir. 1967) (Hastie, J)
(equating acquiescence with consent); United States v. Annett Ford, Inc. (In re Annett Ford,
Inc.), 64 B.R. 946, 947 (D. Neb. 1986) (Beam, C.J.); In re Hotel Assocs., 6 B.R. 108, 109-11
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (King, J.) (failure to request relief from the automatic stay and motion
for trustee to be appointed in a Chapter 11 case taken as evidence of consent to the trustee's
reimbursement under § 506(c)); see Presley, Note, supra note 13, at 1110.
169. Central Bank v. Cascade Hydraulics & Util. Serv., Inc. (In re Cascade Hydraulics &
Util. Serv., Inc.), 815 F,2d 546, 549 (9th Cir. 1987) (Wright, J.); General Elec. Credit Corp. v.
Levin & Weintraub (In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.), 739 F.2d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) (Van
Graafeiland, J.) (consent should not be imputed lightly); United States v. Henderson, 274 F.2d
419, 421-22 (5th Cir. 1959) (Rives, C.J.) (acquiescence to reorganization was not consent to
pay expenses); Schindler v. Sharak (In re Salzman), 83 B.R. 233, 241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(Schwartzberg, J.) (mere failure to object does not constitute consent); In re S & S Indus., 30
B.R. 395, 398-99 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (Brody, J.).
170. In re Roamer Linen Supply, Inc., 30 B.R. 932, 935-37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(Schwartzberg, J.); Presley, Note, supra note 13, at 1110.
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negate the use of section 506(c) for reimbursing the tfistee. Making the
rules depend on secured creditor opposition to bankruptcy jurisdiction-
which the Bankruptcy Code clearly permits-simply encourages secured
parties to be needlessly obstreperous. 171 According to Judge Robert
Ginsberg:
Mere cooperation with a debtor or acquiescence in an at-
tempted reorganization is insufficient. The reason for this rule
is clear. Creditor cooperation is a significant factor in a suc-
cessful reorganization. That is particularly true of secured
creditor cooperation. To require secured creditors to fight
every step of the way in a Chapter 11 case or risk being saddled
with all the costs of a failed reorganization effort under 11
U.S.C. § 506(c) would be antithetical to the purposes of Chap-
ter 11. A secured creditor should be encouraged to work with
the debtor in the reorganization effort. After all, a successful
Chapter 11 case will benefit the debtor, the secured creditor,
and the unsecured creditors.. However, secured creditor coop-
eration in the reorganization effort is not the same thing as se-
cured creditor's consent to finance the costs of the
reorganization case. Such consent on the part of the secured
creditor must clearly appear from the circumstances.' 72
In any case, under the current Bankruptcy Code, the trustee has
complete power to foreclose whether the secured creditor consents or
not. Therefore, unless the secured creditor knowingly and voluntarily
endorses a pattern of specific expenses by the trustee, claims of secured
creditor consent should be viewed with great suspicion. 173
171. See Note, Allocation of Expenses Incurred in a Bankruptcy Sale Free of Liens, 53
COLUM. L. REV. 845, 852 (1953) (making this argument under the former Bankruptcy Act).
172. In re Chicago Lutheran Hosp. Ass'n, 89 B.R. 719, 730-31 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988)
(citations omitted). Judge Ginsberg may have undercut his argument by admitting that reor-
ganizations can "benefit" secured parties, because such benefit is the premise that allows
charges under § 506(c). Id. at 730. Elsewhere in his opinion, he specifically finds that the
secured creditor in question received no "benefit" from the reorganization at hand. Id. at 731.
173. One circumstance does seem to signal genuine consent to paying for a trustee. If the
secured creditor moves for a trustee at a time when no unencumbered assets exist to pay the
trustee, courts reasonably have concluded that the secured creditor must have consented to the
trustee's commission as a § 506(c) expense. In re Bob Grissett Golf Shoppes, Inc., 50 B.R.
598, 609 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (Bostetter, J.), modified, 76 B.R. 89 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1987).
In In re AFCO Enterprises, Inc., 35 B.R. 512 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983) (Clark, J.), the secured
creditor made this motion at a time when there was debtor equity in the property. Id. at 513,
517. Later, the collateral deteriorated to such an extent that the secured creditor was under-
secured. Id. Given the priorities of § 506(c)-the trustee is required to use existing debtor
equity before invading the secured claim--consent at a time when there is a cushion should not
be consent to invade-the secured claim later.
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III. SALES EXPENSES VERSUS GOING-CONCERN EXPENSES
A. Cash Collateral
A major purpose of this Article is to describe when the expenses of a
going concern may be charged to a secured creditor under section 506(c).
But before such a description can be meaningful, it is necessary to say a
few words about cash collateral in bankruptcy.1 74
Whether the underlying collateral is personal property or real prop-
erty, a secured creditor frequently has a lien on cash proceeds obtained
by the debtor. 17  A bankruptcy trustee may wish to use this cash collat-
eral to meet expenses of the estate.1 76 These expenses may be either regu-
lar administrative expenses, against which secured parties must be
adequately protected, or section 506(c) expenses, for which the secured
creditor must pay. The rules pertaining to the use of cash collateral dif-
fer radically, therefore, depending on the nature of the trustee's expenses.
Consider first a trustee who wishes to use cash collateral for general
administrative purposes, not for the purposes described in section 506(c).
Bankruptcy Code section 363 describes the power of a trustee to use
property generally. Sometimes, use or sale requires court approval. For
example, if the trustee wishes to sell property outside of the ordinary
course of business, court approval of the sale is required.'7 7 But if the
trustee is authorized to run a business, sales within the ordinary course of
business do not require court approval.
178
In any case, with regard to cash collateral, the trustee must always
obtain either court approval1 79 or the secured creditor's consent' 80 to use
174. Cash collateral is defined broadly to include negotiable instruments, documents of
title, deposit accounts, and other cash equivalents. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (Supp. 1991).
175. See U.C.C. § 9.306(2) (1972) (providing an automatic security interest in all proceeds
of original collateral).
176. Cash collateral even includes amounts the secured creditor owes to the debtor that,
but for the automatic stay in bankruptcy, the secured creditor could set off against counter-
vailing obligations. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Jim Kelly Ford, Ltd. (In re Jim Kelly Ford,
Ltd.), 14 B.R. 812, 814 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (Shadur, J.). That is, the trustee may sometimes do
more than withhold a portion of cash from the secured creditor. The secured creditor might
have to pay that cash to the trustee, at which point it might be raided for § 506(c) expenses.
177. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1988).
178. Id. § 363(c)(1).
179. Id. § 363(c)(2)(B). A trustee can use cash collateral only if she is authorized to oper.
ate a business. Id. § 363(c)(1); Cusanno v. Fidelity Bank, 29 B.R. 810, 812-13 (E.D. Pa. 1983),
vacated, 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984).
180. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(A). The consent pertaining to cash collateral must be "affirma-
tive express consent from all parties involved before using cash collateral." Freightliner Mkt.
Dev. Corp. v. Silver Wheel Freightlines, Inc., 823 F.2d 362, 368 (9th Cir. 1987). "[I]mplied
consent is insufficient." Id. at 368-69.
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it."' If courts sometimes hold that secured creditors have no right to
adequate protection until they ask for it, when it comes to cash collateral,
the trustee has an affirmative burden of showing the court that adequate
protection has been provided. 182
But this may mean that the trustee can have cash collateral without
adding anything at all to secured creditor rights, if other collateral is
sufficient to cover the secured creditor's full claim. Equity cushions are
routinely deemed adequate protection.18 3 If, apart from the cash collat-
eral, the secured creditor is still protected with an equity cushion, then
the trustee may freely use the cash without undertaking any further ade-
quate protection obligations.18 4 For example, suppose the secured credi-
tor claims $90, but the collateral is $90 in illiquid assets and $10 in cash.
If the trustee needs the $10 in cash for purposes that cannot be brought
within the meaning of section 506(c), and if the illiquid collateral is not
181. For remedies against the trustee for violating these rules, see John C. Chobot, Enforc-
ing the Cash Collateral Obligations of Debtors in Possession, 96 COM. L.J. 136, 138 (1991).
These remedies include retroactive adequate protection, denial of discharge, forfeiture of use of
any further cash collateral, appointment of a trustee (in Chapter 11), and relief from the auto-
matic stay.
182. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Plaza Family Partnership (In re Plaza Family Partnership), 95
B.R. 166, 171 (E.D. Cal. 1989) (Coyle, J.) ("The primary concern of the court in determining
whether cash collateral may be used is whether the secured creditors are adequately pro-
tected."); In re Kain, 86 B.R. 506, 512 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988) (Gregg, J.). But see
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Ruggiere (In re George Ruggiere Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.), 727 F.2d
1017, 1019 (11th Cir. 1984) (Anderson, J.) ("Thus, when a creditor opposes a proposed use of
cash collateral, the guiding inquiry is whether its security interests are 'adequately pro-
tected.'" (emphasis added)).
With regard to noncash collateral, it is frequently said that a secured creditor has no right
to adequate protection until it asks for it. This claim, however, is controversial. Compare Julia
A. Goatley, Note, Adequate Protection and Administrative Expense: Toward a Uniform System
for Awarding Superpriorities, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2168 (1990) (arguing for such a requirement)
with Carlson, supra note 75, at 146-50 (arguing against such a requirement).
183. Pistole v. Mellor (In re Mellor), 734 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1984) (Alarcon, J.).
184. First Nat'l Bank v. Marine Optical, Inc. (In re Marine Optical, Inc.), 10 B.R. 893, 894
(D. Mass. 1981) (Bankr. App. Panel) (Cyr, J.) (holding that § 507(b) did not require court to
save cash collateral lest equity cushion eroded); In re Precast Structures, Inc., 122 B.R. 304,
305-06 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990) (Clark, J.); In re Landing Assoes., 122 B.R. 288, 291 n.3
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (Clark, J.); In re Triplett, 87 B.R. 25, 26-27 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988)
(Ayers, J.); In re Grant Broadcasting, Inc., 71 B.R. 376, 384-86 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.) (Scholl, J.),
aff'd, 75 B.R. 819 (E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Prime, Inc., 15 B.R. 216, 217-19 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1981) (Pelofsky, J.); Harvey R. Miller & Martin J. Bienenstock, Adequate Protection in Respect
of the Use, Sale or Lease of Property, 1 BANKR. DEV. J. 47, 78-80 (1984); see also Stein v.
United States Farmers Home Admin., 19 B.R. 458 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (Twardowski, J.).
In Stein, the noncash collateral of an undersecured creditor was appreciating in value. Id. at
460. In light of this, Judge Twardowski allowed the debtor to have cash collateral because the
secured creditor was obtaining appreciation value instead. Id. This decision is implicitly pre-
mised on the notion that appreciation value belongs to the debtor, and that the undersecured
creditor is automatically capped by the initial valuation of the collateral. See Carlson, supra
note 155, at 258-72.
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expected to decline in value, the reorganization may have the $10 cash
without having to supply any adequate protection for it, because the cash
is entirely debtor equity.
It is only when the use of cash collateral drives the secured claim
under water that the trustee must do something positive about adequate
protection. 185 In such a case, the trustee must supply substitute collat-
eral"8 6 to make up for the cash taken. 187 Suppose, for example, the se-
cured creditor claims $90, but the collateral is $80 in illiquid assets and
$10 in cash. If the trustee needs the $10 in cash for purposes outside the
scope of section 506(c), she will have to supply the secured creditor with
$10 of noncash collateral as a means of adequate protection. But ade-
quate protection of cash collateral and the existence of 506(c) expenses
are mutually exclusive ideas. If, on the one hand, the trustee wishes to
use cash collateral for some purpose that benefits the general creditors,
adequate protection of the secured creditor is required. On the other
hand, if the trustee wishes to use the cash collateral to benefit the secured
creditor within the meaning of section 506(c), no adequate protection is
required, because the trustee is absolutely entitled to recover section
185. Some courts require the trustee to preserve the equity cushion for future accrual of
postpetition interest and expenses. See supra text accompanying notes 31-39. The statement
in the text does not hold if these cases represent the law. Instead, the trustee would have to
preserve enough debtor equity to cover anticipated postpetition interest and collection ex-
penses not yet accrued.
186. 11 U.S.C. § 361(2) (1988) (describing substitute collateral as a mode of adequate pro-
tection). Other modes of adequate protection would not be appropriate when the trustee
wishes to invade cash collateral needed to keep a secured creditor fully secured. For example,
§ 361(1) authorizes cash payments, but there is no sense in paying cash when the point is that
the trustee needs the cash collateral strictly because the estate is illiquid. See In re Certified
Corp., 51 B.R. 768, 771 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985) (Chinen, J.) (trustee had to supply under-
secured creditor with substitute collateral in order to take encumbered cash).
187. Many courts do not disclose whether the secured creditor is over- or undersecured.
As a result, their rightness or wrongness pursuant to the text cannot be assessed. See, e.g., In
re International Horizons, Inc., 11 B.R. 366, 369 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (ordering substitute
collateral in exchange for permission to use cash collateral).
One student commentator proposes some rules for the use of cash collateral. See Stephen
C. Mount, Note, Standards and Sanctions for the Use of Cash Collateral Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 63 TEx. L. REv. 341, 352-61 (1984). The author argues that, early in the case or in
emergency situations, a bankruptcy court could order the use of cash collateral without a
hearing. Later, when no emergency exists, a hearing should be held, but cash may be used
only for ordinary business expenses and only if a successful reorganization is in the offing.
What is missing from this proposal is a discussion of whether the secured creditor is over- or
undersecured. If the former is the case, the cash is simply debtor surplus-property of the
estate-which could be spent for any purpose a trustee might legitimately have. If the latter is
the case, the cash should be used for any legitimate purpose, but only if the cash is replaced
with substitute collateral. In the latter case, if the expense falls under § 506(c) the trustee
should get the cash without supplying adequate protection.
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506(c) expenses from the collateral anyway.' 88 Indeed, section 506(c)
expenses cannot even be collected until noncash collateral is sold and
thereby rendered into cash collateral. Therefore, in the above example, if
the trustee can show that the expenses were reasonably necessary to pre-
serve or dispose of collateral, the trustee may take the $10 without re-
placing it with other substitute collateral.
As stated earlier,'89 one definition of value may require the deduc-
tion of transaction costs that the secured creditor would have borne
under state law. That is, the secured claim is sometimes defined as what
a buyer would pay, minus the transactions costs of sale. This deduction
implies that the buyer pays in more than the secured creditor receives.
Suppose the trustee does sell the collateral. In that case, part of the cash
the buyer pays is always debtor equity, which is property of the estate.
The rest belongs to the secured creditor as cash collateral.
If the trustee incurs section 506(c) expenses, the trustee should first
use up the debtor equity,' 9 ' including the equity created solely by reduc-
ing value by the amount of hypothetical transactions costs. If estimated
transactions costs are accurate, the trustee never needs to reduce the size
of the secured claim. But suppose section 506(c) expenses exceed the
surplus. In such a case, the trustee must exhaust the surplus first and
only then invade the secured claim.191
These are the rules when the cash surplus is still in place. But a
smart trustee will make sure there is no surplus when it is time to invade
the secured claim. If the cash is really surplus, the trustee (with court
approval) can spend it without supplying adequate protection, provided
she can prove that the noncash collateral will not depreciate in value. If
the trustee takes this cash collateral and spends it, then, when it is time
to charge 506(c) expenses, the trustee necessarily must invade the cash
collateral needed to keep the secured creditor from becoming under-
secured. The equity cushion previously in place is now gone, so that it
can no longer be used to soak up the expenses sought under section
506(c). Such a scheme enriches the general estate at the expense of the
secured creditor. Yet this scheme is authorized by the principle that says
188. To be sure, the trustee must first exhaust the debtor equity in the collateral, but once
this is done, § 506(c), if it applies, negates any right the secured creditor has to adequate
protection. See supra text accompanying notes 12-39.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 139-53.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 12-39.
191. In re Codesco, Inc., 18 B.R. 225, 228-29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Schwartzberg, J.);
cf. 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (1988) (senior lien for new credit appropriate only if subordinated credi-
tors are adequately protected and credit is not otherwise available). Of course, some courts
would hold that the trustee can never invade the secured claim. See supra notes 159-61 and
accompanying text.
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that the trustee need not preserve debtor equity for unaccrued interest or
collection expenses.
One line of authority rebels against this interpretation of the rules
pertaining to cash collateral, according to which the trustee can take
cash collateral freely, so long as the cash is part of debtor equity. In Sun
Bank/Suncoast v. Earth Lite, Inc. (In re Earth Lite, Inc.),'92 Judge Pas-
kay ruled that
the Debtor should not be permitted to use cash collateral with-
out making some payments to the secured party just because it
has, at the commencement of the case, a meaningful equity
cushion in the collateral. To accept this proposition would
mean that a debtor may freely use cash collateral until the col-
lateral is reduced to the amount of indebtedness during which
time the secured party is deprived of income, for which it bar-
gained when the loan was granted.193
On this view, excess cash collateral can only be taken if some paydown of
the secured claim also occurs. Judge Paskay's proposed rule, however,
does not seem to have been applied very often. 194 It has been expressly
rejected at least once. 95
Other courts insist on putting severe restrictions on how cash collat-
eral can be spent, even though the cash is part of the equity cushion. One
month before his opinion in Earth Lite, Judge Paskay declined to impose
the Earth Lite rule on the debtor. Rather, in In re Mickler ' 96 Judge
Paskay raised all the same concerns, and substantially restricted the
amount of cash the Chapter 11 debtor could take for necessary living
expenses. 197 And in In re Dixie-Shamrock Oil & Gas, Inc.,19 Judge
Paine required that the cash collateral, clearly part of the equity cushion,
be spent solely on maintaining and repairing the collateral. 199 Such ex-
penses probably would fall within the scope of 506(c) expenses. Restrict-
ing expenditure in this way is completely appropriate when no equity
192. 9 B.R. 440 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
193. Id. at 444.
194. Judge Paskay's rule has been followed in In re Epstein, 26 B.R. 354, 357-58 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1982) (Bare, J.); cf. In re Polzin, 49 B.R. 370, 374 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (Maho-
ney, J.) (equity cushion was eroding too quickly to justify taking cash without further adequate
protection).
195. See In re Triplett, 87 B.R. 25, 27 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988).
196. 9 B.R. 121 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
197. Id. at 124.
198. 39 B.R. 115 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984).
199. Id. at 118.
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cushion exists,2"° because such a restriction amounts to awarding the
trustee 506(c) expenses. But such a restriction is questionable when the
cash collateral falls entirely within the equity cushion not needed to ade-
quately protect the secured claim.
This background will help elucidate the complicated cases that are
discussed in the next section.
B. Charging the Secured Creditor With Ordinary Administrative
Expense
1. The Existing Tests
Assuming that they are necessary and reasonable, and benefit the
secured creditor, the expenses that can be charged with respect to a sale
of collateral are not surprising: court costs, attorneys' fees, advertising,
storage, and brokerage fees are among the items that courts routinely
compensate. 20 1
In rehabilitative proceedings, however, property is not always sold.
One difficult and confusing issue with regard to section 506(c) concerns
the expense of maintaining collateral in a Chapter 11 case. Section
506(c) specifically mentions reimbursement for the expense of preserving
the collateral. The expense of maintaining the collateral might alterna-
200. See Hartigan v. Pine Lake Village Apartment Co. (In re Pine Lake Village Apartment
Co.), 16 B.R. 750, 754-56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Schwartzberg, J.).
201. See generally WILLIAM COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKR UPTcY 1 506.06 (15th ed.
1991) (discussing when costs and expenses of trustees are compensated). Among expenses not
allowed under § 506(c) is the value of the trustee's own labor. See Settles v. United States (In
re Settles), 75 B.R. 229, 230 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987) (Altenberger, J.) (holding that farmer
debtor-in-possession not entitled to compensation for labor because § 506(c) is limited to reim-
bursement of the trustee's monetary expenditures); Kotter v. First State Bank (In re Kotter),
59 B.R. 266, 269 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986) (Altenberger, J.) (holding that wages for one debtor
and use of debtors' land and machinery were not recoverable expenses under § 506(c)); First
Nat'l Bank v. B & L Enters., Inc. (In re B & L Enters., Inc.), 26 B.R. 220, 222-23 (Bankr.
W.D. Kan. 1982) (Brown, J.) (holding that, in a Chapter 7 liquidation, trustee's statutory fee
under § 326(a) cannot be brought in under § 506(c)); Moister v. Farmers Bank (In re Truitt),
15 B.R. 169, 170 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (Robinson, J.) (in selling the debtor's home, trustee
may not recover commission under § 506(c)). But see First Nat'l Bank v. Taylor (In re Mod-
em Mix, Inc.), 18 B.R. 748, 749 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1982) (Caffey, J.) (trustee fee allocated to
sale of collateral).
Nor can the trustee recover the expenses of resisting secured creditor efforts to lift the
automatic stay. In re Gire, 107 B.R. 737, 738 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1989); see also In re S & S
Indus., 30 B.R. 395, 398 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (Brody, J.) (no creditor committee ex-
penses, unless the debtor consents); Barr v. Juniata Valley Bank (In re DeLancey), 106 B.R.
363, 366 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Schwartzberg, J.) (trustee could not collect expense of de-
nying the debtor a discharge, where undersecured creditor would have benefited). It should be
emphasized that in DeLancey the denial of discharge may have benefited the undersecured
creditor's unsecured deficit claim, but it had nothing to do with administering the collateral
itself, as § 506(c) requires. Id.
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tively be'(1) a safeguard that benefits the secured creditor and that the
secured creditor ought to pay for; or (2) the very kind of expenses against
which the secured creditor is entitled to adequate protection. °2 How
can a court tell which is which?
The standard tests for determining which expenses are chargeable to
the secured creditor and which are chargeable to the bankrupt estate are
usually expressed in terms of a primary/indirect benefit distinction,20 3 or,
alternatively, a purposeful/incidental 2cs or a definite/remote distinc-
tion.20 5 That is, the secured creditor can be made to bear an expense if
the benefit received is primary, purposeful, or definite, but not if the ben-
efit is indirect, incidental, or remote. These categories do not tell us any-
thing. They depend entirely on presupposition and are therefore legal
conclusions disguised as legal arguments.
Furthermore, in one sense expenses are always incidental if it is
maintained that the trustee works for the general creditors, not the se-
cured creditors.20 6 If the trustee's motive is the key to section 506(c)'s
jurisdiction,20 7 then section 506(c) is written out of the Bankruptcy Code,
because benefit to the secured creditor is always incidental. For instance,
if a secured creditor holding a floating lien is undersecured, reorganiza-
tion will be premised on generating enough value to pay off the secured
claim with enough funds left over for the general creditors. In this sense,
the secured creditor is only incidentally benefited, because the motive of
202. See Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 16 B.R. at 756.
203. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Delta Towers,
Ltd.), 924 F.2d 74, 77 (5th Cir. 1991); Central Bank v. Cascade Hydraulics & Util. Serv., Inc.
(In re Cascade Hydraulics & Util. Serv., Inc.), 815 F.2d 546, 548 (9th Cir. 1987) (Wright, J.);
Brookfield Prod. Credit Ass'n. v. Borron, 738 F.2d 951, 953 (8th Cir. 1984) (McMillian, J.);
DeLancey, 106 B.R. at 366 (primary versus indirect); In re West Post Rd. Properties Corp., 44
B.R. 244, 246 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Schwartzberg, J.) (trustee expenses fall under § 506(c)
"when expenses of preservation are incurred primarily for the benefit of the secured interest");
In re Codesco, Inc., 18 B.R. 225, 228-29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Schwartzberg, J.).
204. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Peltz (In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.), 762 F.2d 10,
12 (2d Cir. 1985) (Van Graafeiland, J.).
205. Communication & Studies Int'l, Ltd. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A. (In re World of
English, N.V.), 21 B.R. 524, 527 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (Drake, J.) (finding connection be-
tween expense and benefit to be sufficiently direct); Codesco, 18 B.R. at 229 ("too indefinite and
remote to support an allowance").
206. See, e.g., In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 301 (7th Cir. 1982) (Swygert, J.).
207. See Sells v. Sonoma V (In re Sonoma V), 24 B.R. 600 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (trustee
who proved mechanic's lien did not exist could not recover expenses from the mortgagee sec-
ond in line because the trustee eliminated the lien for the benefit of the general creditors);
Brookfield Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Borron, 36 B.R. 445, 448 (E.D. Mo. 1983) ("To recover, the
debtor-in-possession must expend the funds primarily to benefit the creditor, who must in fact
directly benefit from the expenditure. Expenses undertaken to improve the position of the
debtor-in-possession, although indirectly benefiting the creditor, are not recoverable."), aff'd,
738 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1984).
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the trustee is to obtain value for the unsecured creditors.2"' Only if you
accept the premise that reorganizations can benefit secured parties is it
possible to use a primary/indirect distinction.20 9
Another popular test2 10 for determining when maintenance costs fall
within the scope of section 506(c) is derived from a pre-Code case, First
Western Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Anderson,2" in which Judge Hamley of
the Ninth Circuit remarked, "[i]n every case where free assets are insuffi-
cient, the court should balance the misfortune of having some allowances
go unpaid against the possible inequity of charging them all against mort-
gaged property." 212 To this was appended a long footnote enumerating
factors justifying 506(c) charges, which may be paraphrased as follows:
(1) If things had gone well, would the secured creditors have "bene-
fited"? (2) Were services rendered primarily for the secured creditors?
(3) Were the services competently delivered? (4) Did the secured credi-
tors consent? (5) Did the secured creditors cause any delays?2 13
These standards are not as impressive as they might seem at first
glance. The first standard simply repeats the statute and is of no help.
The second repeats the primary/indirect test, also a test without content.
The third standard, in requiring competence, probably repeats the statu-
tory requirement that the expenses were necessary. The fourth standard
repeats the "consent" test.21 4 And the final test seems contrary to the
Bankruptcy Code, since secured creditors have no duty to cooperate with
208. See In re Roamer Linen Supply, Inc., 30 B.R. 932, 936-37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(Schwartzberg, J.) ("It defies credulity to have this court believe that the debtors and their
attorneys labored to negotiate a liquidation on a going concern basis ... so as to enhance
primarily the collateral ....").
209. See In re Gagel & Gagel, 24 B.R. 674, 675 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (Anderson, J.) ("a
reorganization plan may consist of only a workout with secured creditors"). See also Rubin,
supra note 26, at 424:
The competence of the trustee and his counsel redounds to the possible benefit of all
classes of creditors. The failure of reorganization may mean that the efforts on behalf
of these classes have failed. But no reason appears why only unsecured creditors-
who may not have instituted the proceedings, who may have demanded immediate
liquidation, who may all along have protested the proceedings-should be made to
pay the costs.
210. In re Bob Grissett Golf Shoppes, Inc., 50 B.R. 598, 603 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (Bos-
tetter, J.), modified, 76 B.R. 89 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1987); In re Manchester Hides, Inc., 32 B.R.
629, 634 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983) (Thinnes, J.); In re Korupp Assocs., 30 B.R. 659, 662
(Bankr. D. Me. 1983) (Goodman, J.); Communication & Studies Int'l, Ltd. v. Bank of Am.,
N.T. & S.A. (In re World of English, N.V.), 21 B.R. 524, 527 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (Drake,
J.).
211. 252 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1958).
212. Id. at 548.
213. Id. at n.8.
214. This test is discussed in the context of liquidations supra in the text accompanying
notes 163-73.
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the bankruptcy trustee. Why should the secured creditors pay for trustee
expenses incurred simply because the secured creditors pursued their
rights under the Bankruptcy Code?21 For these reasons, the Anderson
test does not seem sufficient. Can a better mediating principle be found
than these conclusory distinctions? 21
6
2. A Proposed Mediating Principle
Here is a suggested compromise. It requires a two-step analysis.
The first step requires the court to determine whether debtor equity ex-
ists. If it does, then, pursuant to the priorities established in the first part
of this Article,21 v the trustee must take any expenses out of the debtor
equity. In the second step, the court must determine who owns the cash
flow of the debtor-in-possession. If all income is subject to a floating lien,
then maintenance of the income should be charged to the secured credi-
tor. If the income is unencumbered, then at best-depending on which
215. In the much cited case, In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1982), the trustee
retained collateral for appraisal. When the appraisal suggested that the collateral was over-
encumbered, the trustee moved to abandon it. The trustee then asked for compensation for
keeping the collateral from the time he was appointed until the time the collateral was aban-
doned. Citing Anderson, Judge Swygert ruled:
Although the secured creditor eventually "benefited" from these expenses in the
sense that it received the assets unharmed, it did not in any way consent to or cause
these expenses. Further, placing the responsibility for these expenses on a secured
creditor would discourage a trustee from taking reasonable steps to assess an estate's
position.
Id. at 301. Based on these principles, Judge Swygert decided that, after the trustee proposed
abandonment, the secured creditor delayed its objection to bearing the expense too long. In
Swygert's opinion, this delay justified charging the expense to the secured creditor. Id. The
benefit started when the trustee proposed to abandon the property and ended when the secured
creditor answered the petition by objecting to the imposition of § 506(c) charges. Id.
Even if "causation" were a standard authorized by § 506(c), it is hard to swallow the fact
that the secured creditor "caused" the § 506(c) expense by delaying its objection to them.
Those expenses would have continued in any case until such time as the trustee obtained court
approval for abandonment under Bankruptcy Code § 554. See also In re West Post Rd.
Properties Corp., 44 B.R. 244, 246 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Schwartzburg, J.) (section 506(c)
charges are appropriate when the secured creditor causes such expenses).
216. In In re Chicago Lutheran Hospital Ass'n, 89 B.R. 719 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988), it was
argued that because the Supreme Court imposed costs on undersecured parties in United Sav-
ings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates., 484 U.S. 365 (1988), § 506(c) should be
interpreted to do the same. Chicago Lutheran Hosp., 89 B.R. at 731-32. Judge Robert Gins-
burg was unimpressed:
It is true that the United States Supreme Court has ruled that it is constantly permis-
sible for an unsecured creditor to be required to bear some of the cost of a reorgani-
zation effort. However, it requires a quantum leap to conclude that Congress did in
fact intend to impose the costs of a failed reorganization effort on secured creditors in
[§ 506(c)].
Id. (citations omitted).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 12-39.
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valuation theory the court uses--only a small portion of the going con-
cern expenses should be charged, according to what the secured creditor
would have borne had there been no bankruptcy.
a. Encumbered Income
We start with security interests that encumber the entire income
stream of a firm. In such a case, the secured creditor should be charged
with the maintenance of that income stream under section 506(c). This
proposition can best be understood in the context of valuation theory.
The value of the collateral is a function of future income reduced to pres-
ent value. Hence, any valuation of the secured creditor's interest must
include prospective income. But as time goes by, the income, as it ac-
crues, is not necessarily the collateral itself, even though it is the bench-
mark by which the value of the collateral is calculated.21 Rather, the
income may belong to the debtor, while the capital asset belongs to the
creditor. The division of property into income and capital (or, as the
common-law lawyers would have called it, the equitable and legal title) is
mitigated by the fact that the debtor is obligated to pay debt service. If
the debtor does not do so, then the secured creditor can repossess the
collateral and, with it, the right to collect future income. The collection
of future income is accomplished when the collateral is sold at a foreclo-
sure sale, because the buyer is paying a price that capitalizes future in-
come into present value.
The sale of the collateral, then, is tantamount to the secured creditor
recapturing the cash flow from the capital asset. Obviously, the secured
creditor cannot always trust the debtor to maintain the collateral so that
the present value of the collateral is preserved at a constant level. In-
stead, the secured creditor may suspect that the debtor may try to depre-
ciate the collateral early, taking out excess income and leaving the
secured creditor with a low-value asset upon default. In other words, the
debtor has power to change from a long-term strategy to a short-term
218. Judge Leif Clark recognized this in In re Landing Assoc., 122 B.R. 288 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1990):
The appraisals only valued the interest conferred by the [secured party's] deed of
trust. They did not purport to value the wholly separate interest conferred by [the
secured creditor's] entitlement to rents prior to foreclosing on the property. To be
sure, the appraisals examine the rental stream, but only in the context of its repre-
senting the income capacity of the property after its sale (by foreclosure or
otherwise).
Id. at 297. The "or otherwise" should be taken to mean "any sale free and clear of the mort-
gage lien."
Judge Clark fell into serious error, however, when he insisted on valuing the collateral
and the income stream separately. In fact, the collateral is nothing but prospective income.
19921
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strategy in exploiting the capital. To guard against this danger, creditors
commonly insist that some of the cash surplus be used to pay down the
principal amount in the hope that the outstanding capital debt remains
fully collateralized. Installments on principal therefore help guarantee
that the capital liability depreciates as fast or faster than the capital asset.
As an additional refinement, secured creditors can often encumber
the income stream itself. Typically, the secured creditor authorizes the
debtor to control the income stream until default. After default, the se-
cured creditor has the option to collect cash proceeds. Thus, with real
estate mortgages, for example, the law often awards rental income to the
mortgagee between the time collateral is repossessed and the time it is
sold.
That a security interest encumbers the income stream itself ends up
being somewhat overrated, in terms of the theory of secured lending.
The typical pattern is for the secured creditor to authorize the debtor to
use the encumbered income for maintenance expenses, debt service, and
perhaps some paydown of the collateral. In such an arrangement, the
debtor is entirely free to spend the extra money at her discretion until
default occurs. This is more or less the situation when the income stream
is not deemed collateral but is instead simply viewed as an attribute of
owning capital.
Suppose it were otherwise. Suppose a mortgage agreement requires
that all rental income be applied to pay down the mortgage debt. The
debtor is allowed no living expenses and no income to pay taxes, hire
groundskeepers, maintain the common areas, or perform similar tasks.
Instead, the mortgage agreement requires the debtor to meet these ex-
penses from her own private funds, while the rental income goes entirely
to pay the principal amount of the loan. In such a case, the mortgagee
has, in effect, arranged for a very rapid paydown of principal, one that
occurs faster than the income from the collateral would otherwise justify.
Such an unusual requirement obviously requires the debtor to contribute
funds from sources other than the income from the capital. For an eco-
nomically rational debtor to do so, it must still be expected that the capi-
tal will be self-supporting. What the debtor contributes today toward
maintenance of the capital base (because income is not available for this
purpose) she must recover later after the mortgage debt is paid off.
Otherwise, the debtor has no motive to agree to such a surrender of all
rights to income.
What the above discussion has attempted to establish is that, in eco-
nomically rational secured lending, a loan is premised on self-supporting
collateral, with income sufficient to cover maintenance expenses and debt
service. Furthermore, if the income stream should change over time for
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the worse, economic rationality demands that the debt be paid down to a
point at which the property is still self-sustaining. Of course, if the
debtor cannot afford to pay down the debt, the secured creditor can fore-
close and sell the property to a buyer who will finance the purchase by
borrowing at a level in which the property once again becomes self-
supporting.
If bankruptcy is viewed as a general cure of defaults and a de-accel-
eration of debts and contracts,219 then bankruptcy should, as a theoreti-
cal matter, have the effect of disencumbering the income stream. In
exchange for this, the present value of the capital base is preserved
through maintenance and management, and the secured creditor obtains
debt service-perhaps reduced if the income stream has shrunk since the
original mortgage agreement was executed.
The Bankruptcy Code reflects this vision. A secured creditor who
dissents from a Chapter 11 plan, in a cram down, can be forced to take
rights roughly described above, provided that:
(1) the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such
claims, whether the property subject to such liens is retained by
the debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of such
claims; and
(II) that each holder ... receive on account of such claim
deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of
such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at
least the value of such holder's interest in... such property.22°
That is, under the cram down idea, the secured creditor's collateral is
valued as the net future income of the collateral reduced to present value.
If the secured creditor is to receive payments over time, these payments
must have a present value equal to the collateral. The discount rate on
these future payments should precisely equal the net expected future in-
come of the collateral. If the property is depreciating, the net-income
idea implies that part of the income is charged against depreciation ex-
pense. This expense is paid to the lender as a means of paying princi-
pal,2 so that the cram down plan represents an installment loan in
which principal is slowly retired. This is especially so when the statutory
cram-down requirements are supplemented by the judge-made rule that
outstanding principle must not dip below the value of the collateral.222
219. This is a major theme of Bankruptcy Code § 365(b) (cure and reinstatement of execu-
tory contracts) and § 1123(b) (cure and reinstatement of loan agreements).
220. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (1988).
221. Cf. id. § 361(1) (cash payments for depreciation expense).
222. See Abbott Bank-Thedford v. Hanna (In re Hanna), 912 F.2d 945, 949-51 (8th Cir.
1990) (Chapter 12); In re O'Farrell, 74 B.R. 421, 424 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987) (if long-term
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It is significant that the secured creditor in a cram down receives the
present value of only net future income. That is, future income is disen-
cumbered so that the surviving firm can use the income to maintain the
property. This cram-down phenomenon implies that, in the period
before confirmation of the reorganization plan, cash collateral should
likewise be disencumbered to maintain the integrity of the cash flow.
For this reason, if a secured creditor has encumbered income and
claims it as cash collateral, any expense that is incurred to maintain that
income should be chargeable to the secured creditor under section
506(c). Furthermore, since the economics of lending presuppose that the
debtor will be paid for managing the property-economists would call
this expectation the debtor's opportunity costs---even some compensa-
tion to the trustee should fall under section 506(c), at least as a matter of
theory.2
23
If the cram down provision awards to the secured creditor debt ser-
vice based on the value of the collateral, and if, on the basis of this, in-
come should be disencumbered on behalf of the trustee, then economic
theory demands that the secured creditor should obtain pre-cram-down
debt service in exchange for pre-cram-down disencumbrance.
The Bankruptcy Code conforms to this demand. Undersecured
creditors have been deprived of their postpetition interest by United Sav-
ings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates.224 But this rule does
not apply to undersecured creditors who have encumbered the income
stream. 225 As the income accrues, the collateral grows in size, while the
debt instruments are given to a secured creditor, the secured creditor must also have adequate
protection over the life of the debt); In re Butler, 97 B.R. 508, 513 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1988)
(same result in a chapter 12 case); In re Johnson, 63 B.R. 550, 554 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986).
223. But see Settles v. United States (In re Settles), 75 B.R. 229, 230 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987)
(Altenberger, J.) (farmer debtor-in-possession not entitled to compensation for labor because
§ 506(c) is limited to reimbursement of the trustee's monetary expenditures); Kotter v. First
State Bank (In re Kotter), 59 B.R. 266, 269 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986) (Altenberger, J.) (same).
Cases in which the secured creditor does not own the income stream or straight liquidation
cases rest on a different footing. In these cases, it is appropriate that compensation for the
trustee is forbidden to come within the scope of § 506(c). See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. B & L
Enters., Inc. (In re B & L Enters., Inc.), 26 B.R. 220, 222-23 (Bankr. W.D. Kan. 1982)
(Brown, J.) (in a Chapter 7 liquidation, trustee's statutory fee under § 326(a) cannot be
brought in under § 506(c)); Moister v. Farmers Bank (In re Truitt), 15 B.R. 169, 170 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1981) (Robinson, J.) (in selling the debtor's home, trustee may not recover commis-
sion under § 506(c)).
224. 484 U.S. 365 (1988). For a further discussion of Timbers, see supra notes 68-79 and
accompanying text.
225. Income producing property has always been an exception to the rule that under-
secured creditors may not obtain postpetition interest. Ex Parte Penfold, 87 Rev. Rep. 385,
386 (1851); Carlson, supra note 1, at 590-95.
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226capital asset (a reflection of prospective income only) stays the same.
Out of this increase, the secured creditor obtains something resembling
the postpetition interest, while the estate gets the balance of income.
Under the reading of section 506(c) proposed here, the secured creditor is
responsible for the maintenance expense of the income stream. Only the
balance left over comprises the quasi-interest payments described
above.22
7
This theory refers to the expenses necessary to generate income, but
it does not address the actual costs of formulating and confirming a
Chapter 11 plan.228 In cases involving floating liens, in which all income
is encumbered, resolving whether these expenses can come in under sec-
tion 506(c) will determine whether a reorganization proceeding is even
possible. Given that a Chapter 11 plan substitutes for a foreclosure
sale-the expense of which a secured creditor would bear-a good argu-
ment exists for imposing this expense on the secured creditor. This is
especially so if the proceeding succeeds in producing a large going con-
cern bonus for the secured creditor, as happened in In re Pullman Con-
struction Industries.229 In Pullman, the secured creditor, a floating
lienor, claimed $8 million in prepetition amounts.230 Judge Schmetterer
estimated the corporation's liquidation value at $2,579,750231 and going-
concern value to be $5 million.232 Such a large going-concern surplus
represents value added to what the secured creditor would have obtained
on its own. It should have been easy for Judge Schmetterer to bring the
cost of reorganization within section 506(c) on these numbers, but he
declined to do so.233
A good rule for cases involving encumbered income and under-
secured creditors would invoke section 506(c)'s central concept and
charge these creditors with the costs of reorganization, but only to the
extent they "benefit" the secured creditor. This should mean that, in
226. Either the collateral does not depreciate, or, if it does, the secured creditor is compen-
sated for depreciation by adequate protection payments under Bankruptcy Code § 361(1).
227. See In re Landing Assocs,, 122 B.R. 288, 297 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (Clark, J.)
(where secured creditor did not object, secured creditor's interest in rental income limited to
net rent after income).
228. See In re Pullman Constr. Indus., 107 B.R. 909, 934 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (Schmet-
terer, J.) ("The only corporate liabilities considered when utilizing a discounted cash flow
approach are current, operating expenses, such as labor, materials, overhead, salaries, and
other items that must be paid to generate the cash inflows.").
229. 107 B.R. 909 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (Schmetterer, J.).
230. Id. at 915.
231. Id. at 936. At the start of the case, the court had estimated the company's liquidation
value at $3,182,500. Id. at 919.
232. Id. at 933.
233. Id. at 940-43.
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cases in which the reorganization produces a going-concern bonus for the
secured creditor, reorganization costs might be imposed only up to the
amount of the bonus. These costs should not be imposed if they mean
that, in Chapter 11, the secured creditor would do worse than it would
do under state-law foreclosure.
In Pullman the debtor-in-possession aggressively claimed that not
only the costs of counsel in the Chapter 11 proceeding should be covered,
but many other prepetition and postpetition claims as well."' The list
consisted of all claims-including some prepetition claims-that section
1129(a) required to be paid before a Chapter 11 plan could be con-
firmed.235 In other words, the debtor-in-possession asked that payment
to unsecured priority creditors be made into a 506(c) expense,236 because
paying those creditors was necessary to confirm a Chapter 11 plan and
therefore capture the going-concern bonus for the secured creditor. Un-
less this was done, or unless new value were contributed to the firm, the
plan could not be confirmed.237
Judge Schmetterer felt this request was too much to bear. "Such
theory," he wrote, "is not supported by law, logic, or authoritative eco-
nomic evidence." '238 But, in fact, these expenses were simply the sine qua
234. Id. at 934.
235. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1988). For example, the debtor-in-possession sought to bring
the following prepetition unsecured claims within the purview of § 506(c). First, a prepetition
tax claim, with a priority under § 507(a)(7), which must be paid in full within six years. Id.
§ 1129(a)(9)(C); Pullman, 107 B.R. at 915 n.4. Second, a priority wage-benefit claim, which
must be paid in cash, if the claimant votes against the plan. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(4),
1129(a)(9)(B). The claimants voted to accept the Pullman plan, however, and were to be paid
over one year. Pullman, 107 B.R. at 915. Third, a senior mechanics' lien claim, which encum-
bered an account receivable. Id. Such claims must be paid or otherwise crammed down at full
value. See 11 U.S.C. § l129(b)(2)(A).
236. The debtor-in-possession made this request in two different ways. First, it requested
that the valuation of the going concern be reduced by the cost of administration. Pullman, 107
B.R. at 940. Second, it requested that the valuation not be so reduced, but that the secured
claim be reduced pursuant to § 506(c). See id. at 941. Since, either way, a radically under-
secured creditor bears these costs, there is no need to distinguish between each of these claims
and both may be treated as 506(c) claims. Judge Schmetterer, however, thought that the valu-
ation claim rendered § 506(c) into "mere surplusage." Id at 940.
237. In fact, the costs of reorganization were so large that the going-concern bonus was
overwhelmed. Id. at 934. This left the old shareholders with a dilemma: under the absolute
priority rule, the secured creditor could use its unsecured deficit to guarantee that no old
shareholder receive any value under the plan. 11 U.S.C. § l129(b)(2)(B)(ii). The old share-
holders proposed to exploit the controversial "new value" exception to the absolute priority
rule to justify their continuation as shareholders. Pullman, 107 B.R. at 943-48. Because of
valuation problems, however, Judge Schmetterer ruled that these shareholders could not avail
themselves of this exception. Id. at 949-51.
238. Pullman, 107 B.R. at 940. In explaining this conclusion, Judge Schmetterer makes
several errors. First, Schmetterer remarks, "That argument could be made in virtually every
bankruptcy case, because successful reorganization is the predicate of realizing going concern
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non of the going-concern bonus, all of which was going to the secured
creditor. For this reason, the expenses should have been allowed under
section 506(c), at least to the extent of the going-concern bonus.
b. Unencumbered Income
If the income stream is unencumbered by a floating lien, then, in an
economically rational deal, section 506(c) win never come into play. The
encumbered capital base should produce enough income to maintain it-
self. Furthermore, under Timbers the undersecured creditor has no right
to debt service at all from this unencumbered income. Therefore, the
trustee has an opportunity to gain at the secured creditor's expense (or to
keep a nonviable property afloat longer), because she can avoid using the
income for debt service.239
Nevertheless, even with this subsidy, the secured creditor might
need to go beyond income and invade principal as well. Some might jus-
tify a strict reading of section 506(c) because, if the trustee' cannot make a
go of it even though the secured creditor was made to subsidize the
trustee by foregoing debt service, then the trustee's need for section
506(c) suggests truly poor judgment by the trustee in keeping the enter-
prise going. This poor judgment should be punished by a denial of com-
pensation under section 506(c).
Of course, section 506(c) does authorize the trustee to charge to the
secured creditor "the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses ofpreserv-
ing ... such property." 2' A rule against charging going-concern ex-
value." Id. In fact, this argument applies only in cases in which an undersecured floating
lienor has encumbered the income stream of the firm. Not all reorganizations suffer from this
feature. Second, Judge Schmetterer thought that the debtor's valuation expert, Robert S.
Hamada of the University of Chicago, had contradicted his testimony in In re Jartran, Inc., 44
B.R. 331, 352 (Bankr. N.D. II. 1984) (Fisher, J.). Pullman, 107 B.R. at 941. There, Hamada
calculated going-concern value without subtracting the costs of reorganization. But it is ap-
parent in that case that sufficient unencumbered assets existed to pay substantial dividends to
nonpriority creditors. See Jartran, 44 B.R. at 345. Therefore, in Jartran the costs of reorgani-
zation could be taken from debtor equity and did not adversely affect the size of the secured
claims. Third, Schmetterer saw the debtor's request as transforming unsecured claims into
superpriority claims for postpetition credit under Bankruptcy Code § 364(d), when no such
credit had been extended. Pullman, 107 B.R. at 940. In fact, they become § 506(c) expenses,
which clearly outrank secured claims. In re Saybrook Mfg. Co., 130 B.R. 1013, 1021 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1991) (Hersher, C.J.) (noting that § 506(c) permits invasion of liens granted under
§ 364(d)).
239. Justice Scalia apparently realized this to be a weakness of his opinion in Timbers. His
attempt to counter this incentive was to urge bankruptcy courts to allow the stay to be lifted
under § 362(d)(2)(B) whenever it appeared that the reorganization was unlikely to result in a
confirmable Chapter 11 plan. United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484
U.S. 365, 375-76 (1988).
240. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (emphasis added).
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penses under section 506(c) would read the above-quoted words out of
the Bankruptcy Code, a result that Timbers itself does not allow.
241
Here is a compromise that gives meaning to the above-quoted words
of section 506(c). This compromise is based upon the familiar hypotheti-
cal imagining exercise that requires us to ask what expense the secured
creditor would have incurred if the debt were in default and the secured
creditor were liquidating collateral in a reasonable manner.242 If the
court has used a liquidation valuation standard, these costs have already
been taken out of the valuation. Charging the secured creditor again
would appear to be double-dipping by the trustee. A liquidation stan-
dard therefore should be deemed to rule out any preservation expenses in
a Chapter 11 case.
A different rule would apply if a court has used a going-concern
valuation standard. Under this standard, there are no hypothetical costs
of selling the collateral. As a result, the secured creditor's secured claim
will be deemed larger than if a liquidation standard were used. Under
this valuation theory, the court should deduct the preservation expenses
the secured creditor would have incurred if the secured creditor had fore-
closed in the absence of bankruptcy.243
c. Summary
The previous discussion has suggested a rule for charging adminis-
trative expenses of a going concern to secured creditors: when no debtor
equity exists and when the security agreement covers the entire income
stream of the enterprise, the secured creditor should bear the expense of
maintaining the income stream and should take only the net income, plus
any additional payments needed to cover depreciation of the capital base.
If the debtor owns the income stream, the debtor should use that income
stream to protect adequately the collateral and otherwise run the enter-
241. According to Justice Scalia, any interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code that renders
statutory words useless is defective. See supra text accompanying notes 68-79.
242. Brookfield Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Borron, 738 F.2d 951, 953-54 (8th Cir. 1984) (Bright,
J., dissenting) (between August and Thanksgiving the secured creditor would have fed the
turkeys anyway, and so should be charged with this expense under § 506(c)). In Borron, the
majority thought that feeding turkeys only "indirectly" preserved the value of the collateral for
the secured creditor. Id. at 952-53. Obviously, the court does not know much about animal
husbandry or, for that matter, Thanksgiving. See also Erie Hilton Joint Venture v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 125 B.R. 140, 148-50 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (Bentz, J.) (secured creditor
had to bear real estate taxes between lifting the automatic stay and sheriff's sale).
243. In re World Wines, Ltd., 77 B.R. 653, 658 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1987) (Coar, J.) (where
stay was lifted and secured creditor repossessed, pre-repossession storage expense could be
brought under § 506(c)). But see In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 301 (7th Cir. 1982)
(Swygert, J.) (pre-abandonment expenses did not benefit secured parties and therefore could
not be charged under § 506(c)).
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prise. No section 506(c) expenses should be allowed in this case, except
those corresponding to the costs a secured creditor would have borne if
there had been no bankruptcy and the secured creditor took control of
the business for the purpose of foreclosing on it instead. Even here, this
deduction should occur only if the bankruptcy court has valued the col-
lateral according to a "going-concern" theory, whereby no hypothetical
transaction costs have reduced the secured claim.
The next section critically analyzes the existing case law from the
perspective of this proposal for deciding when to charge administrative
expenses to secured creditors.
C. The Existing Law of Encumbered Income Streams
The following cases involve floating liens of secured creditors that
soak up most or all of the property of the debtor. In these cases either
the debtor has no equity in the collateral or what equity there was has
been dissipated. As a result, the trustee is in the position of having to
bring her expenses within the scope of section 506(c), so that she can
force the secured creditors to pay the bill.
1. Cases That Hold the Secured Creditor Harmless From
Administrative Expenses
Proving that the quality of mercy is strained after all, some courts
refuse to make the secured creditor bear the expense of general adminis-
tration under any conditions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has taken the lead in cases of this genre, in two separate opinions
involving the Flagstaff Foodservice bankruptcy.
Like most failing businesses, Flagstaff had encumbered every last
scrap of property before seeking refuge in Chapter 11. Its principal fin-
ancier, General Electric Credit Corporation (GECC), was in for $22 mil-
lion at the time of the bankruptcy petition, but it was secured by $42
million in assets. 2" It is not clear where this valuation of assets came
from. The officers of Flagstaff claimed on appeal that this number repre-
sented the going concern value of the firm.245 The book value seemed
lower.246 The hypothetical liquidation value would have been lower still.
244. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Peltz (In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.), 762 F.2d 10,
11 (2d Cir. 1985) (Van Graafeiland, J.).
245. Id. at 12.
246. The bankruptcy court noted that the scheduled assets were only $32 million, although
a contingent claim against another entity was not listed on the schedule. Allstate Fabricators
Corp. v. Flagstaff Foodservice Corp. (In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.), 56 B.R. 899, 906
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Abram, J.).
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In any case, to keep the firm going, GECC agreed to supply an extra
$9 million in exchange for a superpriority lien on all the firm's assets. 247
It quickly became apparent that the business was not viable. At first,
Flagstaff hoped to remain in Chapter 11 by means of a liquidating Chap-
ter 11 plan, but even this was not possible. Thus, like ninety percent of
Chapter 11 filings,24 8 the Flagstaff case devolved into a Chapter 7
liquidation.249
By the time it became clear that the reorganization could not suc-
ceed, Flagstaff had paid down most of GECC's claim. Flagstaff still
owed about $4 million, but, by this time, GECC was undersecured. 25 0
At this stage, all remaining assets of the debtor were encumbered by
GECC's lien-perhaps by the prebankruptcy security interest or by the
postpetition superpriority lien, depending on what assumptions were
made about the retirement of GECC claims.
This is a common enough dilemma in Chapter 11. Chapter 7 con-
versions often happen precisely when no unencumbered assets are left.
In the Flagstaff decisions, two influential groups had discovered they had
not yet been paid-the lawyers and the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS).2"' The IRS claims were for withholding taxes. If the IRS does
not receive these "trust fund taxes," the officers are made personally lia-
ble.252 Hence the officers took up the cause of paying the IRS with
enthusiasm.
The IRS and the lawyers could only obtain payment if they could
get cash collateral under section 506(c). Accordingly, they sought a rul-
ing from the court that the attorneys' fees and the withholding taxes
ought to be paid out of GECC's collateral.253
Judge Prudence Abram granted both the attorneys' fees and the
withholding tax claim out of GECC's collateral. Ruling on the with-
holding tax claim, she emphasized the fact that the entire Chapter 11
247. This is permitted by Bankruptcy Code § 364(d). See 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (1988).
248. See In re Robbins, 119 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (Queenan, J.).
249. Allstate Fabricators, 56 B.R. at 900.
250. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Peltz (In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.), 762 F.2d 10,
11 (2d Cir. 1985) (Van Graafeiland, J.).
251. Allstate Fabricators, 56 B.R. at 901.
252. 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (1988).
253. To be perfectly accurate, some of the lawyers did not cite § 506(c) as authority for
their getting paid. Instead, they must have relied on the general administrative priority that
lawyers for creditor committees often get. Wilson Freight Co. v. Citibank, N.A., 21 B.R. 398,
401 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Knapp, J.). Some of these services included trying to avoid GECC's
lien. Nevertheless, the district court approved GECC's paying for these so-called services on
the theory that "the 'context' of the case 'necessarily imports' that appellees' services benefited
GECC 'by preserving or enhancing the bankrupt estate.'" General Elec. Credit Corp. v.
Levin & Weintraub (In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.), 739 F.2d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1984).
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filing was for the benefit of GECC, in that it had generated a payout of
about $27 million to GECC. She wrote:
GECC has indeed been the primary financial beneficiary of the
Chapter 11 liquidation effort since it holds a security interest on
all assets in the estates [of the various corporate entities com-
prising Flagstaff] and those assets have not yet yielded enough
to pay off the indebtedness due it.254
Furthermore, Judge Abram thought that, by cooperating with the Chap-
ter 11, GECC had consented to the administrative expenses and there-
fore could not now challenge their allowance under section 506(c).255
GECC appealed both defeats. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit agreed with GECC. With regard to attorneys' fees, Judge
Van Graafeiland zeroed in on the fact that at the start of the Chapter 11
case, GECC was substantially oversecured. "As a matter of fact," Van
Graafeiland remarked, "it requires rather strained logic to conclude that
GECC actually benefited from appellees' services. '  That is, given the
fact that GECC was substantially oversecured at the start of the case and
could have been paid in full, how could it be said that the work of the
debtor's lawyers b'nefited GECC, within the meaning of section
506(c)?25 7 A number of courts have followed this lead and ruled that
there can be no 506(c) recoveries in this circumstance.2z 8
254. In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 29 B.R. 215, 217 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
255. Id. at 220.
256. Levin & Weintraub, 739 F.2d at 76.
257. This precise point is argued contrarily in In re AFCO Enterprises, Inc., 35 B.R. 512
(Bankr. D. Utah 1983), a case discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 273-78. There,
Judge Clark wrote: "The court rejects [the secured creditor's] interpretation of benefit; it is too
narrow. The definition of benefit encompasses more than the bottom line of a balance sheet.
Preservation of the going concern value of a business can constitute a benefit to the secured
creditor." Id. at 515 (citing Communication & Studies Int'l, Ltd. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A.
(In re World of English, N.V.), 21 B.R. 524 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982); Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Jim Kelly Ford, Ltd. (In re Jim Kelly Ford, Ltd.), 14 B.R. 812 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980)).
258. See Brookfield Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Borron, 738 F.2d 951, 953 (8th Cir. 1984); Sable
v. Liberty Say. Bank (In re Blue Ridge Motel Assocs.), 126 B.R. 477, 480-81 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1991) (Fitzgerald, J.); Guy v. Grogan (In re Staunton Indus.), 75 B.R. 699, 702 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1987). In Borron, the value of the collateral-a flock of turkeys-had deteriorated since
the petition was filed. 738 F.2d at 952. The debtor fattened the turkeys for the Thanksgiving
Day market and eventually sold them. Id. at 952-53. The debtor was denied § 506(c) compen-
sation for turkey feed because the benefit to the secured creditor was merely indirect. Id. at
954 (Bright, J., dissenting). Apparently we are to believe that fending off the starvation of
livestock is merely an abstract or indirect benefit to the secured creditor.
For a case where the trustee was denied the expense of feeding hogs because the reorgani-
zation was unsuccessful, see In re Combined Crofts Corp., 54 B.R. 294 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1985), where Judge Martin stated:
The expenses in question have not been proved to be necessary. The debtor was
under no obligation to continue hog raising operations in order to protect [the se-
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These decisions amount to a rule that the trustee must preserve
debtor equity for the purpose of covering section 506(c) expenses-a
view criticized earlier in this Article as extending the scope of secured
claims generally beyond the amount by which they have been allowed.25 9
That is, where a debtor equity once existed and now does not, these
courts have blocked section 506(c) charges. This result implies that the
trustees should have preserved debtor equity for any charges that might
have accrued.
Furthermore, Judge Van Graafeiland rejected the idea that GECC
had. consented to be charged under section 506(c): "Although a secured
creditor may consent to bearing the costs of professional fees incurred by
a debtor in possession, 'such consent is not to be lightly inferred.' "260
The withholding-tax claim was also denied,261 in spite of some facts
that threw the Flagstaff officers into a sympathetic light. In order to
fund the Chapter 11 bankruptcy, Flagstaff borrowed the funds needed to
keep the doors open. In its statement of expenses to GECC, the officers
accidentally listed the net payroll figures, not the gross figures. As a re-
sult, GECC, which might have lent more, lent just enough to pay the
take home pay but not enough to pay the withholding taxes.262
This omission cut no ice with Judge Van Graafeiland. He wrote:
Appellees contend that the value ascribed to GECC's col-
lateral as of the commencement of the Chapter 11 proceedings
was based on a going concern valuation of the assets and that
Flagstaff's reorganization attempt helped preserve most of this
value. Assuming for the argument that this is so, it does not
suffice to warrant section 506(c) recovery. The debtor in pos-
session also must show that its funds were expended primarily
cured creditor's] interest in the hogs. Rather, operations were continued in order
that the debtor could attempt to reorganize, an endeavor that regrettably proved
unsuccessful. Under these circumstances the costs attendant upon the debtors' at-
tempt to reorganize may not be charged to the secured party.
... In order to make this showing the debtors would have needed to prove that
the net yield of their 1985 hog liquidations was greater than the net yield that [the
secured creditor] would have received had it liquidated the hogs at the first available
opportunity in 1984.
Id. at 298; cf. In re Hollie, 42 B.R. 111, 120-22 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984) (Hershner, J.) (refus-
ing to let dairy farmer use cash collateral unless the collateral itself were adequately protected,
though § 506(c) is not mentioned, nor is the purpose of the debtor-in-possession's expenditure
of cash).
259. See supra text accompanying notes 31-39.
260. Levin & Weintraub, 739 F.2d at 77 (quoting In re S & S Indus., 30 B.R. 395, 398
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983)).
261. General Elee. Credit Corp. v. Peltz (In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.), 762 F.2d 10,
13 (2d Cir. 1985).
262. Id. at 11.
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for the benefit of the creditor and that the creditor directly ben-
efited from the expenditure. A debtor does not meet this bur-
den of proof by suggesting possible or hypothetical benefits.
Proof of direct benefits sought and received by GECC is com-
pletely lacking in this case.263
Thus, Judge Van Graafeiland ruled against the charge under section
506(c) because the expenses of administration such as payroll withhold-
ing taxes benefited the general creditors and had only an "incidental"
benefit to the secured parties.2
Judge Van Graafeiland's opinions place a great deal of stress on the
quantitative aspect of the word "benefit," which appears in section
506(c). Judge Van Graafeiland could not conceive of a Chapter 11 "ben-
efiting" a secured creditor when the secured creditor started the proceed-
ing oversecured and ended up being undersecured. That is, "benefit"
must mean that the secured creditor is better off as a result of the
trustee's action than without. We saw earlier, however, that this defini-
tion of "benefit," when coupled with a liquidation theory of value
(wherein hypothetical transaction costs are deducted from the value of
the collateral) reads section 506(c) out of the Bankruptcy Code.z65
In contrast, although she specifically denied it,266 Judge Abram
viewed the word "benefit" in qualitative, not quantitative, terms. Rather
than scrutinizing the result-comparing what the secured creditor would
have received given the trustee's intercession to what the secured creditor
would have received on its own-Judge Abram simply inquired whether
the purpose of Chapter 11 was, in part, to benefit the secured creditor. If
the Chapter 11 proceeding did result in a great deal of liquidation into
cash of hard assets, and if those cash proceeds were used to pay down a
great deal of the secured debt, Judge Abram thought that the Chapter 11
"benefited" the secured creditor.
In Flagstaff, the bankruptcy judge and the Second Circuit had dif-
ferent ideas about what constitutes a "benefit" to secured creditors. It is
263. Id. at 12.
264. Id. at 12-13; accord C.I.T. Corp. v. A & A Printing, Inc., 70 B.R. 878, 881 (M.D.N.C.
1987) (Bullock, J.) (rent expenses for building where printing press was housed); In re Bellman
Farms, Inc., 86 B.R. 1016, 1021 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1988) (Ecker, J.) (accruipg senior tax liens
cannot be charged to a secured creditor under § 506(c)).
265. See supra text following note 162.
266. Judge Abram perceived herself as following a quantitative interpretation of the word
"benefit." In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp., 29 B.R.,215, 219 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). Citing
the millions that GECC was actually paid, she wrote, "While often its interpretation rests
upon subjective standards, benefit to the secured creditor must be shown in the quantitative,
not qualitative or generalized sense." Id. (citing Dozoryst v. First Nat'l Say. & Loan Ass'n, 21
B.R. 392, 394 (D. Ill. 1982) (Shadur, J.)).
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not clear whether the appeals court viewed itself as reviewing findings of
fact or findings of law. If the former, then Judge Abram's findings were
entitled to the usual respect appellate courts give triers of fact. In New
Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n (In re
Delta Towers, Ltd.),2 67 the Fifth Circuit made clear that these were find-
ings of fact and, accordingly, gave the bankruptcy judge great latitude in
failing to find any benefit to the secured creditor.268 In Delta Towers, a
utility company claimed that its services helped preserve a hotel for a real
estate mortgagee who also claimed fixtures and furniture. 269 The mort-
gagee did not have a lien on cash proceeds from the hotel business, which
in any case was not operating during the period in question.270 Judge
Johnson sustained the bankruptcy court's finding that the utility com-
pany had not benefited the secured creditor within the meaning of section
506(c).27 1 Such a holding is consistent with the theory presented in this
Article-that secured creditors who do not own the income stream
should not be charged with its maintenance. 2
2. Cases That Make the Secured Creditors Pay
Some courts have not resisted the temptation to make the secured
creditor pay section 506(c) expenses when otherwise the trustee must go
uncompensated. In re AFCO Enterprises2 73 is a leading example of this
genre. In AFCO Judge Glen Clark wrote:
While as a general rule, secured creditors should not be
charged with the expenses of administration, the courts have
carved out an exception based upon the equitable doctrine of
unjust enrichment. When the secured creditor is the only en-
tity which is benefitted by the trustee's work, it should be the
one to bear the expense. . . where there is no corresponding
benefit to the unsecured creditors.274
In AFCO the collateral was a resort hotel. A trustee ran the resort for a
267. 924 F.2d 74, 77 (5th Cir. 1991) (Johnson, J.).
268. Id. at 78; accord Equitable Gas Co. v. Equibank, N.A. (In re McKeesport Steel Cast-
ings Co.), 799 F.2d 91, 93 (3d Cir. 1986) (Higginbotham, J.) (clearly erroneous standard of
appellate review applies to the bankruptcy court sitting as the fact finder, but not to the district
court).
265. Delta Towers, 924 F.2d at 75-76.
270. Id. at 77-78.
271. Id. at 79.
272. See also Hospitality, Ltd. v. Fidelity Say. & Loan Co. (In re Hospitality, Ltd.), 86
B.R. 59, 61-62 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (Markovitz, J.) (secured parties did not pay, but un-
clear who owned income stream).
273. 35 B.R. 512 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983) (Clark, J.).
274. Id. at 515.
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few months and then gave up. The resort was abandoned to the secured
lender, who sold the property to itself by bidding in its secured claim.
The trustee then tried to charge the secured creditor with maintenance
expenses incurred during the trusteeship.275 Judge Clark considered, but
rejected, a hypothetical exercise whereby the secured creditor would pay
the expenses the secured creditor would have had to bear if no bank-
ruptcy had ensued.276 Instead, Judge Clark, emphasizing the need to
protect the trustee's business judgment, insisted on charging the secured
creditor with the trustee's maintenance expense.277
In AFCO it was not clear whether the income stream belonged to
the estate or to the secured creditor. If the debtor-in-possession owned
the income stream, 78 then, according to the theory advocated in this
Article, the secured creditor should not pay to maintain: it. On these
facts, the secured creditor would have been denied adequate protection of
its security interest when the hotel was charged with the expense of
maintaining the income stream. On the other hand, if the hotel receipts
were cash proceeds belonging to the secured creditor, then expenses for
275. Id. at 513-14.
276. Id. at 515.
277. Id. at 517-18.. One argument the secured creditor made was that, in spite of the
"maintenance expense," the collateral decreased in value during the time the trustee was in
charge. This fact was used to prove that the expenses did not "benefit" the secured creditor as
§ 506(c) requires. Judge Clark rejected this proof and instead protected the trustee's business
judgment. Id. at 515-16.
For another case that was generous to the trustee when a floating lien encumbered all
assets including the income stream, see In re Bob Grissett Golf Shoppes, Inc., 50 B.R. 598,
606-07 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (Bostetter, J.); see also Communication & Studies Int'l, Ltd. v.
Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A. (In re World of English, N.V.), 21 B.R. 524, 527 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1982) (Drake, 3.) (reading pre-Code cases as a "progression ... providing a liberal interpgeta-
tion to the determination of what constitutes the preservation of property in which a secured
creditor has an interest"). Judge Drake went on to remark, "It seems to this Court that merely
keeping a debtor in operation may constitute preservation of property." Id. at 527. Thus,
performance of services for customers rendered accounts receivable collectible, justifying the
imposition of § 506(c) expenses. Id. at 528.
278. Some cases hold that hotel receipts are not rents encumbered by a real estate mort-
gage, but Article 9 accounts receivable. If a mortgagee does not perfect her security interest
under Article 9, the cash flow is disencumbered and belongs free and clear to the bankrupt
estate. In re Nendels-Medford Joint Venture, 127 B.R. 658, 668-69 (Bankr. D. Or. 1991)
(Higdon, J.); In re Ashoka Enters., Inc., 125 B.R. 845, 846 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (Kahn, J.);
In re Oceanview/Virginia Beach Real Estate Assoc., 116 B.R. 57, 59 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990)
(Bonney, J.). Even if the mortgagee does perfect under Article 9, the receivables might be
deemed to be proceeds of a service offered by the hotel, rather than proceeds of the real estate
itself. If so, Bankruptcy Code § 552(a) disencumbers any postpetition hotel receivables from
the prepetition after-acquired property clause. See Craig H. Averch, The Heartbreak Hotel for
Secured Lenders: When Postpetition Revenue From a Hotel Is Not Subject to a Prepetition
Security Interest, 107 BANKING L.J. 484, 487-94 (1990).
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managing the cash flow were properly chargeable to the secured creditor
under section 506(c).
A case with almost identical facts is In re P. C., Ltd.,279 in which the
secured creditor also was saddled with section 506(c) liability. Whereas
AFCO involved abandonment of an income-producing property, P. . in-
volved an asset payment. That is, the debtor transferred the collateral (as
in AFCO, a hotel) directly to the secured creditor in exchange for extin-
guishing of the secured creditor's claim.2"' Like AFCO, it is not clear
who owned the income stream from the hotel prior to the sale. If the
income stream belonged to the debtor-in-possession, the debtor-in-pos-
session should have paid the ordinary expenses of hotel management
prior to the transfer to the secured creditor. If the security agreement
reserved income to the secured creditor pending the sale, then such ex-
penses should be chargeable to the secured creditor under section 506(c).
The P. C. case has an added wrinkle. All the expenses charged to the
secured creditor were incurred after the Chapter 11 plan was con-
firmed.2"' Judge Arceneaux ruled this fact irrelevant in applying section
506(c) to the detriment of the secured creditor.28 2 Yet section 506(c)
cannot justify charges to the secured creditor after confirmation. A
Chapter 11 plan constitutes the sum total of the legal relations between a
debtor and its creditors, once the plan is confirmed. Of necessity, a plan
will include the division of an undersecured creditor's claim into its se-
cured and unsecured parts.28 3 Charging the secured creditor with post-
confirmation expenses has the effect of lowering the secured claim, and it
ought to have the concomitant effect of raising the unsecured ,claim.
284
Yet the unsecured claim is fixed in the plan. Therefore, the court's deci-
2,79. 110 B.R. 232 (E.D. La. 1990) (Arceneaux, J.).
280. Id. at 233-34. The difference between an abandonment and an asset payment can be
further elucidated as follows. In an abandonment, the trustee simply renounces her rights to
the collateral. The collateral then reverts to whomever had property interests prior to the
bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988). Under abandonment, the secured creditor takes a
security interest (governed by Article 9 or other relevant law), and the debtor retakes the
equity. Article 9, of course, requires the secured creditor to hold a sale.
In an asset payment, the trustee conveys the debtor equity to the secured creditor. The
secured creditor now has a combined security interest and debtor equity, which merge together
to form absolute ownership. Now Article 9 does not apply, and the secured creditor is no
longer required to sell.
281. P.C., 110 B.R. at 234.
282. Id. at 236.
283. This division occurs unless the secured creditor makes the perplexing § 111 l(b) elec-
tion. If so, the ceiling that § 506(a) sets on the secured claim is repealed. For details, see
Carlson, supra note 155, at 288-303.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 66-79.
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sion violates the secured creditor's rights under the plan.28 5
It seems apparent that in P. C. the secured creditor's secured claim
was overvalued-the court failed to deduct foreclosure expenses from its
valuation of the collateral correctly, or at all.2" 6 But this mistake-per-
haps" corrigible before confirmation 2 7-- becomes etched in stone after
confirmation. The unexpected maintenance expense that should not
have been charged to the secured creditor should be viewed the same as a
postconfirmation tort claim. That is, the postconfirmation claim impov-
erishes the equity holders of the debtor-in-possession, and then, after
them, the unsecured creditors, but those who hold liens under the plan
should be immune from such unsecured claims.
In re Johnson 288 is a common sort of farm reorganization case in
which the debtors requested use of cash collateral for everyday working
capital.28 9 Judge Martin permitted such use, without compensation to
the secured creditor, on the theory that the money would be used to
maintain the value of cattle, which were also collateral for the secured
creditor.290 But here the entire income stream (the proceeds of milk
from the cows) belonged to the secured creditor, so that the charge was
appropriate. 91 Curiously, in the same year the same Judge Martin re-
fused to compensate a farmer for feeding hogs in In re Combined Crofts
Corp.292 The distinction between the cases may lie in the fact that, in
Johnson the reorganization still seemed feasible,293 whereas in Crofts the
285. Modification of a plan is possible after confirmation only if the plan is not "substan-
tially consummated," a termed undefined by the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 1127(b)
(1988 & Supp. 1991). In P.C the major asset was the hotel, and it had already been trans-
ferred to the secured creditor. P.C., 110 B.R. at 233. Therefore, it seems as if the plan was
substantially consummated and could no longer be modified. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c)
("[E]xcept as otherwise provided in the plan... after confirmation of a plan, the property
dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors, equity security
holders, and of general partners in the debtor."). Arguably, the P.C. decision violates this
provision as well.
For another case allowing some § 506(c) charges after confirmation, see Settles v. United
States (In re Settles), 75 B.R. 229, 230-31 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987) (Altenberger, J.).
286. P.C., 110 B.R. at 235-36.
287. On the power of the bankruptcy court to correct bad valuations, see Carlson, supra
note 155, at 258-72.
288. 47 B.R. 204 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985) (Martin, J.).
289. Id. at 206.
290. Id. at 207-09.
291.- Id. at 207-08. For a case that easily granted the debtor the expenses of harvesting
crops planted prepetition (but refused the cost of planting unencumbered postpetition crops),
see First National Bank v. Hamilton (In re Hamilton), 18 B.R. 868, 873 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1982) (McGrath, J.). Cases in which farmers were denied recompense for feeding the secured
creditor's livestock are gathered supra note 258.
292. 54 B.R. 294, 298 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985), discussed supra note 258.
293. Johnson, 47 B.R. at 209 ("While the Johnsons have demonstrated a willingness to
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reorganization was not working.29 4
Equitable Gas Co. v. Equibank N.A. (In re McKeesport Steel Cast-
ings Co.)295 is a case that half-follows the theory presented earlier. In
Equitable Gas the collateral was sold as a going concern. One secured
creditor claimed inventory and receivables (that is, the income stream)
while the other claimed equipment, fixtures, and real estate. The latter
creditor obviously did not own the income stream. Yet both had to pay
the utility company for energy provided prior to the sale.296 Signifi-
cantly, the secured creditors had already agreed to a cash-collateral order
for the purpose of paying the utility company, but apparently the debtor-
in-possession diverted the funds for some other purpose.2 97 In a sense,
the secured creditors were made to pay twice for the same services.298
Even worse in this very regard is In re Kain,2 99 which stands as a
warning against too much generosity and compassion by undersecured
parties to their debtors. In Kain the undersecured creditor claimed a
security interest in, among other things, hogs and related cash proceeds.
After the bankruptcy petition, cash proceeds had accumulated from the
sale of hogs. The secured creditor consented to the debtors taking sev-
enty-five percent of the cash for everyday expenses on the farm, with the
remaining twenty-five percent being paid to the secured creditor in order
to reduce the outstanding debt."°°
When it came time to confirm the Chapter 11 plan, the debtor tried
to deduct the expenses of feeding the hogs under section 506(c), thereby
reducing the amount of the secured creditor's entitlements under the
effectuate a plan of reorganization, I cannot determine whether an effective reorganization is
probable without a proposed plan. Use of the milk proceeds at this point, however, makes it
more likely that a plan will be effectuated and that there will be a stream of future milk pro-
ceeds in which the creditors will still hold security interests.").
294. See Crofts, 54 B.R. at 297-98, discussed supra note 258.
295. 799 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1986) (Higginbotham, J.).
296. Id. at 94-95. It is also not clear from Judge Higginbotham's opinion whether any
debtor equity existed. This Article has argued that § 506(c) awards are appropriate only when
no equity exists. See supra text accompanying notes 12-39. In that the sale in Equitable Gas
was a sale of the entire going concern, the bankruptcy court must have assigned a share of the
proceeds to the collateral sold according to some accounting assumptions that are not dis-
closed. These assumptions would influence heavily the existence or not of an equity cushion.
297. Equitable Gas, 799 F.2d at 92.
298. Id. at 94-95. The secured creditors' consent to pay the utilities, only to have the
money diverted elsewhere, was actually used against them. The earlier consent was held to be
consent to pay again, this time more efficaciously. Id. at 94. Obviously, this seems rather
unfair. At a minimum, the responsible parties should be made to re-compensate the secured
parties for the defalcation of the cash collateral.
299. 86 B.R. 506 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988) (Gregg, J.).
300. Id. at 509-10.
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Chapter 11 plan.3"1 Judge Gregg's opinion is not clear on this point, but
it is likely that the expenses of feeding the hogs had already been covered
by cash proceeds belonging to the secured creditor. If so, trying to
charge the secured creditor with the same expense again at the time of
confirmation of the plan constitutes unacceptable double-charging. But
if the feeding expenses had been covered by unencumbered cash, the se-
cured creditor ought to have reimbursed the trustee for these expenses.
The court's theory seemed to be that the secured creditor had
waived its right to the security interest on the cash.3 °2 Hence, the dollars
were indeed unencumbered when the trustee paid them to satisfy debts
related to feeding the hogs. And since unencumbered dollars went to
satisfy a 506(c) expense, the trustee was now entitled to recover this ex-
pense from the secured creditor.30 3 It is hard to believe the secured cred-
itor waived its security interest on cash in this way. Waiver, of course, is
supposed to be knowing and voluntary. Yet, according to Judge Gregg,
the secured creditor knowingly agreed to be double charged for 506(c)
expenses. 3°
Although the Kain court might have found that the 506(c) expenses
should have been covered already by the seventy-five percent donated to
the debtor, the court sought to redress the unfairness. The secured credi-
tor had been undersecured. °5 The court therefore ruled that the pay-
ments received by the secured creditor should reduce the unsecured
portion of the debt, leaving the secured portion undisturbed.30 6
This concession, however, was meaningless. If nonproceeds had
been paid to the secured creditor, then a decision that reduces the un-
secured portion of the claim would benefit the secured creditor greatly.
But when the secured creditor has received cash collateral, not only does
the total claim diminish, but some of the collateral disappears (unless it is
somehow replaced).30 7 For example, suppose the secured creditor's total
301. Id. at 507-08.
302. Id. at 516-18.
303.. Id. at 512-14, 518.
304. Id. at 512.
305. Id. at 510-11, 514.
306. Id. at 515.
307. Accord John Fabick Tractor Co. v. Mann (In re Maun), 95 B.R. 94, 96 n.4 (Bankr.
S.D. Ill. 1989) (Meyers, J.) (criticizing the Kain case). In Maun an undersecured creditor
received unencumbered dollars. Judge Meyers held this to be a paydown of the secured por-
tion of the claim. As a result, the debtor had equity in the property and the stay would not be
lifted under Bankruptcy Code § 362(d)(2)(A). Id. at 95-96. One may also ask whether this
new-found debtor equity entitled the secured creditor to postpetition interest under § 506(b).
For the view that § 506(b) awards under such conditions are inappropriate, see In re Broomall
Printing Corp., 131 B.R. 32, 35-37 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991) (Derby, J.); Carlson, supra note 21,
at 387-94.
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claim was $100. The hogs are worth $75 and there is $10 cash collateral,
so that the secured portion of the claim is $85 and the unsecured portion
is $15. The secured creditor is then given the $10 cash collateral. After
that payment, the total claim is $90, but only $75 in total collateral ex-
ists. The secured creditor inevitably has a $15 unsecured deficiency
before and after payment. Applying the cash collateral to reduce the
unsecured deficit was therefore a useless gesture.308 If the court wanted
to reduce the unsecured deficiency, it would have been necessary to give
the secured creditor noncollateral as payment, which was not done. 0 9
3. Summary
As the previous two sections have demonstrated, the case law re-
garding section 506(c) expenses in reorganization cases is in disarray.
Cases such as Flagstaff Foodservices are implacably hostile to the idea
that secured creditors might be made to bear the expenses of operating a
firm during reorganization. Other cases, such as AFCO, are sympathetic.
These cases have no apparent theme or order to them. This Article sug-
gests the cases should be divided between those in which a security inter-
est encumbers the income of a firm and cases in which the income is
unencumbered. Section 506(c) should apply to the first, but not to the
second, type of case. Even when income is unencumbered, the secured
creditor should bear the same preservation or maintenance expenses that
would have been borne by the creditor if there had never been a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. These rules are consistent with the nature of rational
308. Because the value of the hogs stayed constant (whether by new births, more value per
prepetition hog, replacement through expenditure of cash collateral, or replacement through
expenditure of estate funds), Judge Gregg implied that the secured creditor already was pro-
tected adequately for the duration of the case and therefore did not deserve the cash payments.
Kain, 86 B.R. at 513-14.
This observation is based on a confusion. The secured creditor already owned the cash
collateral it had been given during the pendency of the Chapter 11 proceeding. No one was
claiming that such payments were to compensate for the deterioration in the value of the
collateral. If the secured creditor were entitled to cash payments because of depreciation, then
the payments should never be from cash collateral, because such payments further depreciate
the collateral available to the secured creditor. Rather, adequate protection payments may
only be by means of unencumbered dollars. Second, even if the market price of the hogs
stayed constant, the value of the hogs to the secured creditor declined to the extent section
506(c) expenses accrued.
In any case, the purpose of this observation is far from clear. Judge Gregg had already
ruled that the secured creditor was not entitled to adequate protection because it failed to ask
for it. .d. at 512. Given that adequate protection was inappropriate for this reason, Gregg did
not need to observe a steady value of collateral over time.
309. Cf. In re Canaveral Seafoods, Inc., 79 B.R. 57, 58-59 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987) (Proc-
tor, J.) (refusing to allow undersecured creditor to characterize nonproceeds as postban-
kruptcy interest and insisting on treating them as payment on the secured portion of the
claim).
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secured lending, in which income is expected to cover maintenance of the
collateral and debt service to the lender.
IV. CONCLUSION
The relationship between adequate protection of secured creditors
and trustee expenses under section 506(c) is profoundly complicated.
The two are mirror opposites. On the one hand, adequate protection
preserves the collateral from being used or spent in the administration of
the bankrupt estate. On the other hand, section 506(c) subjects the col-
lateral to just these expenses. Section 506(c) itself suggests the mediating
principle-that expenses under section 506(c) must benefit the secured
creditor. Because this single phrase is meaningless unless some content is
provided, this Article has attempted to separate expenses that may be
charged to the secured creditor under section 506(c) from expenses
which the bankrupt estate should bear on its own. This is particularly
difficult in reorganization cases, in which the collateral may never be
sold. The principle for distinguishing between preservation expenses
chargeable under section 506(c) and those not chargeable is the idea that
income-producing property should be self-supporting and should be suffi-
cient to cover debt service. This principle implies that, when the income
stream is part of the collateral, the secured creditor should bear the ex-
pense of maintaining the income stream under section 506(c). When the
debtor owns an unencumbered income stream, the debtor should bear
the cost of maintaining the collateral. This rule provides a rational way
to allocate expenses when no unencumbered assets remain in a Chapter
11 estate.
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